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Abstract 
This paper deals with long-term care (LTC) systems in four developed countries – 
Germany, Japan, Sweden and the U.S.A. – from an economic point of view. Since these 
countries have differing traditions in welfare policy, the role of the state in financing 
and providing LTC services differs considerably. This paper focuses on these 
differences and their practical consequences. Firstly, a theoretical survey is undertaken 
to see under what circumstances and to what degree state intervention can be justified in 
order to increase economic efficiency. Secondly, the LTC systems of the four countries 
are analysed qualitatively in the light of economic theory. Thirdly, the systems are 
compared quantitatively, with the main focus on their distributional impact. 
Furthermore, the issue of how state intervention alters the potential benefit from buying 
a private LTC insurance is analysed, as well as how the internal rate of return from a 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system changes over time in one of the countries (Sweden). 
The main conclusions are as follows: 
• The design of LTC systems in the countries studied mainly follows social 
welfare traditions as developed in other sectors; the only exception being Japan, 
where a much more extensive role of the state in financing LTC has evolved 
over the last ten years compared to the rather modest role of the state in the 
Japanese economy in general. 
• The differences in design of LTC systems have substantial distributional 
implications. All systems are progressive and favourable to women, but there is 
a wide range between the countries. 
• In Sweden, the internal rate of return from a PAYG system is constantly 
decreasing with each cohort, but still positive for all cohorts born before 1990. 
The steady decline of the returns indicates that it will turn negative for later 
cohorts. 
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Comparative Analysis of Long-Term Care Systems 
in Four Countries 
Martin Karlsson 
1. Introduction 
Long-term care (LTC) and its financing has attracted increasing attention in 
most developed countries over the last ten years. One important reason for this is 
obviously the aging of populations that is anticipated to take place in the first decades 
of the 21st century. The prevalence of disability is the highest among people aged 80 
and older. This group is expected to increase in number during the next few decades: 
in the United States, due to the aging of the ‘baby boom’ generation, it is expected to 
increase by nearly 270 percent the next forty years. For Germany, the corresponding 
figure is 160 per cent and for Japan it is more than 300 per cent. Thus, demand for 
long-term care might increase considerably. At the same time, the working population 
is expected to shrink in most countries, making the financing of LTC services 
problematical. 
Contributing to these concerns about LTC financing are the facts that the share 
of elderly living alone is increasing, that there is a trend towards the disintegration of 
families and that the female labour force participation rate is increasing in most 
countries. These factors reduce the availability of care by family members, and thus 
increase the dependence on formal systems, whether private or public. Furthermore, 
as the demand for formal LTC services increases, this sector will have to attract more 
workers – and so wages and total costs might be expected to increase. 
On the other hand, the effects of demographic changes are expected to be 
offset by a general improvement in the health status of the elderly. There are some 
indications that disability spells normally occur at the end of life, regardless of the 
time of death (Zweifel et al [1999]). If these observations are correct, the impact of 
aging will not be as large as suggested above. But even the number of people in their 
last stage of life will increase, and so even dynamic forecasts of LTC costs assume a 
significant increase (OECD [1998]). 
If the importance of LTC services increases, the role of the government in 
LTC financing becomes crucial. Different countries have chosen solutions that differ 
with respect to incentives, the division of responsibility between the public and the 
private, and distributional consequences. This paper tries to deal with issues like this 
in more detail. The purpose is to compare LTC systems in different countries and 
analyse how the responsibility for LTC has been divided between public and private 
institutions. Since LTC is a complex matter, systems are analysed qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively. Particular attention is given to distributional aspects of LTC 
systems. A simple model is developed for this purpose. Furthermore, the prospects for 
private insurance in different institutional settings will be analysed. 
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The paper is organised as follows. In the next chapter, an overview of 
theoretical approaches to LTC is given. The purpose is to investigate the economic 
rationale for state intervention in LTC markets. In the following four chapters, the 
qualitative aspects of LTC systems of four different countries are analysed in some 
detail. The countries have been chosen so as to represent interesting ‘model cases’ of 
LTC financing. In chapter 0, the systems are compared with respect to some 
important features. Above all, the distributional impact of different systems is 
evaluated. In chapter 0 observations from preceding chapters are being analysed. 
2. Theoretical Aspects of Long-Term Care 
1.1 What is Long-Term Care? 
Long-term care (LTC) is a complex matter and it may be defined in a variety 
of ways. One such definition is given by the American Institute of Medicine [1986] as 
“a variety of ongoing health and social services provided for individuals who need 
assistance on a continuing basis because of physical or mental disability”. The 
characteristics of long-term care might become clearer if compared with medical care, 
as is done by Norton [2000]. Norton points out that LTC a) is care for chronic illness 
or disability for which hospital care is no longer deemed appropriate and b) is often 
provided by unpaid caregivers, instead of professionals. In the sequel, these 
definitions will be used. 
2.1 Policy Options 
There are three important aspects of national LTC systems to be taken into 
consideration; firstly, how services are provided, secondly, how services are financed, 
and thirdly, how the need of the individual client is assessed. Provision of services 
may be the responsibility of the family, the public sector, or private companies, or a 
combination of all. Financing may be taken care of by private insurance, out-of 
pocket payments, taxes or social insurance. Assessment of need may be carried out by 
either the provider or the financing institution or some kind of independent body. 
Thus, there are several different combinations for states how to design LTC systems, 
and this fact is reflected by the diversity in national LTC systems. In recent years, 
important reforms have been carried out in some countries, and even within countries 
the diversity seems to have increased (Cohen [1998]). 
One dimension that one might wish to add is the issue of decision-making 
power. This aspect is added by Burchardt [1997] to the standard analysis of private 
and public responsibilities for welfare services. Certainly, a voucher gives a client 
more freedom of choice than a preferred-provider arrangement within an integrated 
system. However, Burchardt’s definition of decision-making power seems inadequate 
in the sense that decisions by agents representing the client – such as care managers – 
are treated as public decision-making. In some cases, it would probably make more 
sense to look upon the agent as a representative of the client. 
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One way to find guidelines for the design of a LTC system would be to turn to 
the concept of economic efficiency.1 According to economic theory, private markets 
are efficient if some stringent conditions are met. If these conditions are not met, there 
is a case for state intervention.2 This intervention may take on many forms, and has to 
be in proportion to the market failure that is present. 
Since there are two potential markets for LTC – LTC services and LTC 
insurance – there are two possible sources of market failures to be taken into 
consideration. Most authors agree that LTC services themselves do not exhibit 
characteristics that would justify state intervention on efficiency grounds (cf. Pauly & 
Zweifel [1996]). One possible reservation in this respect is the case of clients with 
mental impairments, where the sovereignty of the consumer might be threatened in a 
way that would justify care management. 
Concerning LTC insurance, the case is less clear. Thus, in the following 
section, the characteristics of the market for LTC insurance is analysed in more detail, 
to test the case for public intervention or regulation. 
2.2 Market Failure in Insurance Markets 
The need for long-term care represents a considerable loss that has a relatively 
small risk of occurring. Thus, a risk-averse individual would generally like to buy 
insurance against this risk. Consequently, the low demand for private LTC insurance 
has been taken as an indication of market failure. In the sequel, the issue will be 
analysed systematically to see to what extent market failures might be present. 
2.2.1 Insurable Risk? 
Certain conditions have to be met to make a risk insurable. In general, there 
should be a) a definite loss not under the control of the insured, b) a large number of 
homogenous exposures to the same risk, c) the risk should be significantly less than 
one and d) the loss must be unlikely to affect all insured simultaneously (cf. Barr 
[1992]). 
In the case of LTC, the individual has some scope to control the magnitude of 
the expected loss. Firstly, lifestyle might to some extent influence the risk of 
dependence occurring (ex ante moral hazard). Secondly, the need itself is not 
observed by the insurer, but rather some measure of it, and once it has materialised 
the individual might try to influence the assessment process to get as much out of the 
insurance as possible (ex post moral hazard). 
Furthermore, the risk one wishes to insure against is actually costs of care. The 
cost factor – the rate of inflation in care services – represents an intertemporal risk 
that affects everybody in a pool. This interdependence of risk makes diversification 
harder. Besides, the serial correlation of costs may make diversification across cohorts 
impossible (Cutler [1993]). One way to solve this problem would be to offer social 
                                                 
1
 ‘Economic efficiency’ is in this paper defined according to the concept of Pareto Optimality. For a 
thorough examination of this concept, see Cullis & Jones [1992]. 
2
 It should be noted that the public choice school claims that state intervention is not always superior, 
even when market failures are present. 
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insurance, since the government might be superior in dealing with intertemporal risks. 
To private insurers, the only solution is to offer indemnity insurance or to charge 
sizeable risk premiums. 
2.2.2 Free Riding 
Another reason for the non-existence of comprehensive private LTC insurance 
market might be free-riding. There is some evidence from American data that the 
existence of generous Medicaid arrangements tends to decrease demand for long-term 
care insurance (Sloan & Norton [1997]). It should be pointed out, though, that free 
riding behaviour does not have to depend on the existing welfare system. Considering 
the time span involved, it might also be rational not to insure in anticipation of future 
reforms. 
Free riding might potentially challenge the proper functioning of the market. If 
the number of free riders is large, the market gets thinner, which is a problem in itself 
because insurance markets are based on the law of large numbers. Thus, free riding 
may make insurance more costly. 
2.2.3 Adverse Selection 
There are three conditions for adverse selection to be a problem in an 
insurance market: a) the population to be insured is heterogeneous, b) potential 
customers know to what risk group they belong, and c) the insurer is unable to 
discriminate between risk groups. Thus, information asymmetries, or legislation 
constraining the freedom of the insurer to diversify policies, is required for the 
problem of adverse selection to arise. 
It is quite obvious that the population is heterogeneous with respect to LTC 
risk. Swedish data show that there are considerable differences in expected costs for 
LTC between groups defined by social and marital status (SOU [1998]). Among 
people between 65 and 74, the expected cost differs by a factor of 12 between the 
highest (single male unqualified workers) and the lowest group (married female 
white-collar workers). One possible objection would be that differences in life 
expectancy among those groups diminishes this difference. However, recent research 
suggests that remaining life expectancy is a better indicator of care need than age 
(Zweifel et al [1999]). Furthermore, the ‘cost of dying’ in terms of long-term care has 
been shown to increase with age (McGrail et al [2000]). 
Another study of interest is presented by Murtaugh et al (1995), where the 
precision of underwriting criteria to identify high-cost groups was tested. Samples of 
the whole population aged 65 and 75 were employed to estimate the probability of 
being rejected if applying for private LTC insurance. The authors find that the criteria 
used – including inter alia ADL3 limitations, previous illnesses and lifestyle – are 
successful in identifying high risks. For instance, a person who has already an ADL 
limitation exhibits a ratio between expected insurance benefits and premiums around 
three times higher as the group not rejected. However, this result is sensitive to the 
actual design of the insurance contract. If inflation protection and non-forfeiture 
benefits4 are added, most rejected groups exhibit risk profiles comparable to those of 
                                                 
3
 ADL, Activities of Daily Living, is a measure used to estimate the degree of disability. 
4
 Non-forfeiture benefits reimburses a part of unused premiums to the insured. 
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the non-rejected. This is due to the fact that those groups have a higher life 
expectancy and thus benefit less from inflation protection. The only exception are 
clients with cognitive impairments, who still represent an exceptionally bad risk. 
Consequently, there are several instruments available to insurers who want to 
discriminate between risk groups. But are there information asymmetries? One 
attempt to answer this question is made by Norton & Sloan (1997), who include 
personal expectations in an econometric model explaining the decision to purchase 
private LTC insurance. The authors interpret the high significance of one of these 
subjective variables – the probability of being in a nursing home in five years – as 
evidence of the hypothesis that adverse selection is present. Some caution is 
recommended regarding this conclusion, however. A personal belief of this kind is not 
necessarily related to actual risk; it might just as well reflect a greater anxiety, or that 
the client in question is better (worse) informed on general risks of ending up in a 
nursing home. 
To sum up, there is not sufficient evidence that adverse selection is an 
important explanation behind the limited coverage of private LTC insurance. It rather 
seems that screening of potential customers would enable insurers to discriminate 
quite precisely between risk groups, at least if people sign up for insurance at a 
relatively young age. Thus, government intervention could be limited to stipulating a 
maximum age for purchasing LTC insurance. 
2.2.4 Principal-Agent Models 
It has been argued by Pauly [1990] that parents’ demand for LTC suffers from 
a special moral hazard effect because children might decide to reduce their care-
giving in favour of formal care. This issue has been explored in more detail by 
Zweifel & Strüwe [1996, 1998], who model the behaviour of parents and children as a 
‘principal-agent’ problem. 
Zweifel & Strüwe [1998] show that buying LTC insurance might not be in the 
parent’s interest, because the child might reduce its care-giving. This effect is more 
likely to appear if the child has a comparably low wage. Zweifel & Strüwe draw the 
conclusion that a mandatory LTC insurance might represent a loss to a large fraction 
of the population, since it makes the principal-agent relationship less efficient. 
One serious criticism that might be aimed at the principal-agent argument is 
that the decision of the child might be biased by income taxation, so that the child 
provides more informal care than what is economically efficient. Thus, the principal-
agent argument certainly serves as an explanation why coverage of LTC insurance is 
so low, but it is more doubtful as a justification on economic efficiency grounds for 
this outcome. Furthermore, the demographic changes that are occurring in most 
developed countries increase the number of elderly who do not have access to 
informal care, and so diminish the relevance of the principal-agent argument. 
2.3 Optimal LTC Insurance 
Previous sections suggest that there might be a case for mandatory LTC 
insurance. Furthermore, the existence of such programs in some countries calls for 
analysis of how it might be optimally designed. Although government involvement in 
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LTC is increasing in many countries, not much has been written on this topic (Norton 
[2000]). 
One recent article by Miyazawa et al [2000] analyses the issue whether and 
under what conditions social LTC insurance might enhance economic efficiency. 
Using a very simplified model, they first conclude that a mandatory LTC insurance 
can only be justified on efficiency grounds provided that the population growth rate 
exceeds the interest rate,5 which seems very implausible for most developed 
countries. Still, by introducing a health investment externality, the authors find a 
scope for social LTC insurance to enhance efficiency; by altering the relative price of 
health investments, it brings the economy closer to the optimum rate. 
The value of these findings can be questioned, though. Firstly, Miyazawa et al 
use perfectly functioning insurance markets as their benchmark; an assumption that 
sure enough makes it hard for a mandatory insurance to increase efficiency. If there is 
excessive loading of premiums, due to imperfections in the LTC insurance market, 
social insurance might be superior. Furthermore, it is dubious whether the health 
investment externality really is relevant. Firstly, insurance companies should be able 
to detect health investments at least to some degree. Secondly, since the role of social 
LTC insurance in this model is just to shift relative prices, it might just as well be 
done by general income taxes. 
An intuitive analysis is offered by Pauly [1996]. Using efficiency and equity 
criteria as guidelines, Pauly arrives at the conclusion that the American system for 
LTC financing is nearly optimal. The reason is that protection of assets of disabled 
elderly is not an important social objective for the massive majority of nursing home 
residents that do not recover to a normal life. Thus, Pauly confines himself to suggest 
some minor changes of the present American system, such as introducing the option 
to “voucher out” of the Medicaid system as well as improving protection of assets for 
those who recover. 
Pauly’s analysis offers many important insights, but some objections may be 
made to it. Firstly, it is very focused on American conditions and might thus not be 
valid for other countries. In Germany, for instance, the legal responsibility of adult 
children to support their parents might very well give a justification for a more 
general coverage of public LTC insurance. Secondly, economic efficiency might be 
increased if a uniform system is introduced, since administrative costs probably 
increase with the number of players in the LTC market. One might also ask whether 
equity considerations do not require that the ratio between contributions and benefits 
is more advantageous for those with higher income. 
Another peculiarity of Pauly’s article is that he suggests that the price of LTC 
for Medicaid patients be practically zero. The rationale behind this conclusion is that 
LTC access can be regulated by careful assessment of clients’ needs. This two-tiered 
price system does not seem to agree with principles of economic efficiency 
(especially since the price elasticity of Medicaid clients has been estimated to be 
higher than that of private payers). Since there is a moral hazard risk present, all 
clients should face some marginal cost for utilising LTC services. 
                                                 
5
 This is a well-known result from the analysis of pension insurance. The reason is that the rate of 
return in a PAYG (pay as you go) system equals the population growth rate, whereas the rate of return 
in a fully funded system equals the interest rate. 
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The optimal time for purchasing LTC insurance has been analysed by Meier 
[1999]. In a two-period model, the individual may choose to buy LTC insurance at the 
beginning of each period. Meier finds that the early and the late purchase of insurance 
are equivalent in most settings (due to the efficiency of capital markets). Factors that 
may alter this conclusion in favour of late purchase are 1) fixed loading costs in 
insurance premiums, 2) uncertainty about the costs of disability and 3) adverse 
selection regarding risk of pre-retirement disability. On the other hand, if there is 
uncertainty regarding the probability of becoming disabled during old age, buying 
insurance early is preferred since income risk between two periods may be eliminated. 
Meier concludes that late purchase of LTC insurance seems rational; a result that 
should be taken into consideration by policymakers trying to enact mandatory LTC 
insurance. 
2.4 Discussion 
Economic theory remains inconclusive regarding the most efficient system for 
LTC provision. Regarding the services themselves, it is quite clear that they are 
ordinary marketable goods that do not require state intervention to achieve an 
adequate level of production. One could argue that the fact that some amount of LTC 
services is guaranteed to all who need them in all developed countries is a strong 
indication that most people consider access to LTC a right. This is the classic ‘merit 
good’ argument: that some goods cause positive externalities in consumption by the 
poor, and thus should be subsidised by the state. However, this does not justify public 
provision of the services; it would probably be enough to design a voucher scheme for 
the poor (Pauly & Zweifel [1996]). 
Concerning the market for LTC insurance, the case remains less clear. There 
are a number of potential market failures that might justify state intervention. If the 
intertemporal risk aspect is important, which seems to be the case, state intervention 
might be justified. In this case, the state could offer coverage for care costs above a 
certain deductible. This would reduce the uncertainty left in the insurance market, and 
private companies could offer indemnity insurance of the kind that is already 
available. On the other hand, this solution has the disadvantage of splitting the 
responsibility for LTC on two different payers, a solution that might increase 
administrative costs. 
The presence of moral hazard would probably not justify state intervention. 
Also a private insurer may adapt his policies to reduce the amount of moral hazard. 
When ex ante moral hazard is a problem, it is normally suggested that it might be 
tackled by experience rating. It is doubtful whether this option would be efficient in 
the case of LTC insurance, since the insured very often receives benefits close to the 
end of life. Another option, that might lessen the amount of both kinds of moral 
hazard, is coinsurance. Most insurance policies have a waiting period of between one 
month and one year. Furthermore, it is common that insurance companies only offer 
indemnity insurance, facing the insurer with 100 per cent of the risk above a certain 
threshold. Probably, a fixed rate of coinsurance, e.g. 10 per cent, would be more 
efficient in steering the consumer’s behaviour though. 
The problem of free-riding might be solved by making insurance mandatory. 
However, the case for regulation is weaker here than for e.g. auto insurance, since the 
damage of not having insurance only hurts the non-insured himself. A mandatory 
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scheme that is introduced just to reduce free-riding on means-tested benefits is not 
motivated in terms of economic efficiency. 
The problem of adverse selection might be solved by regulating the market. If 
consumers gain an increasing knowledge of their personal risk with age, the 
government might state a maximum age for purchasing LTC insurance. However, 
since most purchasers of LTC insurance seem to prefer buying it at a quite high age, 
this solution might be suboptimal. Another way of getting around the problem would 
be to make insurance mandatory. However, the regulation of the insurance market 
requires some caution. If the freedom on the part of the insurer to set actuarial 
premiums is limited, there is an incentive for insurance companies to attract good 
risks and keep bad risks away. This problem of cream skimming will not arise if 
actuarial premiums are allowed, or if there is a risk adjustment system. 
To sum up, there are some economic efficiency arguments in favour of state 
intervention in the market for LTC insurance. However, there is no rationale for the 
government to offer more than partial coverage. 
If a social insurance is introduced, the government has to choose between a 
PAYG and a fully funded system, or a combination of the two. Arguments in favour 
of a fully funded system are the higher rate of return (Miyazawa et al [2000]) and its 
relatively small vulnerability to demographic changes. Furthermore, a fully funded 
system is more practical in a context where people’s mobility is increasing. Finally, 
intergenerational justice argues in favour of a fully funded system. 
However, a fully funded system has the disadvantage that it is costly to 
introduce, since ordinary LTC has to be paid for at the same time as reserves are 
being built up. Furthermore, the existence of those reserves could represent a 
temptation to politicians to expand LTC services more than would otherwise have 
been the case, thus giving rise to excess consumption of LTC. 
In practice, only PAYG systems, with relatively small reserves, have been 
launched. But even within this context, the issue of intergenerational justice can be 
taken into consideration. Meier [1999] argues that the optimal age to purchase LTC is 
at retirement, and this result should guide the design of a social insurance scheme. 
However, a social LTC insurance can be seen as partly protecting bequests, and thus 
also parts of the working population should contribute to its financing. This argument 
cannot be taken too far, though. As life expectancy increases, so does the age of the 
potential heirs, and burdening of younger cohorts in the working population becomes 
less motivated. 
This theoretical discussion serves as a background for the empirical 
investigation of LTC systems. In the following chapters, the actual design of the LTC 
system in some countries is analysed in more detail. 
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3. Germany 
3.1 Background 
Following a parliamentary decision in 1994, a mandatory long-term care 
(LTC) insurance (Pflegeversicherung) was introduced throughout Germany at the 
beginning of 1995. Up to that date, long-term care had not been a public concern like 
pensions and health care. In 1973, it was indeed made possible to get expenditure 
covered by the health insurance in particularly severe cases, but except for that there 
was no public compensation for long-term care costs. 
It is important to notice, though, that the need for public involvement in long 
term care financing was limited. According to German law, children are obliged to 
support their parents at old age, to the degree that their own resources are insufficient. 
Only if family income and wealth has proven insufficient the elderly may apply for 
social assistance. 
In the seventies, a marked increase in the means-tested public expenditure on 
long-term care could be noted.  This trend continued throughout the eighties, and 
1991 as much as 40 per cent of social assistance expenditures were related to long-
term care. This development might partly be due to insufficient coverage of the public 
pension system: since the German pension insurance offers no basic pension for those 
with a deficient working history. There is a considerable portion of elderly who have 
to rely on social assistance. 
The dramatic increase in the costs for long-term care attracted public attention 
to the problem. Since Germany will experience a considerable ageing of the 
population in the next few decades, there were no prospects that this cost explosion 
might be halted. 
The introduction of a mandatory insurance followed an intense political 
debate, where a wide spectre of reform suggestions was taken into consideration. It is 
not a coincidence that the form finally chosen borrows some of its typical features 
from the health insurance. The welfare political agenda in Germany is very path-
dependent and broad political agreements can normally be reached only within the 
outline of the existing social insurance system. 
In the final legislative proposal, three main objectives of the new insurance were 
stated: 
1. To support and encourage care provided at home by relatives or neighbours, 
so that the client is able to stay in his ordinary home as long as possible. 
Institutional care is only to be provided when care at home is regarded as 
impracticable. 
2. The risk of developing a dependence on social assistance that is solely due to 
need for long term care, shall be eliminated. This goes in particular for 
patients of nursing homes, where reliance on social assistance had increased 
considerably. 
3. To develop an effective and nationally standardised care infrastructure that is 
able to provide professional services of domiciliary as well as institutional 
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care. As a result, the practice of using hospital beds for these patients should 
decrease (Schneekloth & Müller [2000], p. 13) 
3.2 Financing 
The German insurance is a PAYG6 system where risks are pooled and benefits 
are independent of earlier contributions. One peculiarity of the LTC insurance is that 
it has defined contributions and defined benefits at the same time. This means that 
total benefits and total contributions must match on average, and so far this 
requirement seems to have been met. Regarding the outline of the insurance in other 
respects, it might be summarised in the following way (Evers [1998]): 
• All employees as well as individuals with some other kind of income have 
to be insured. In addition, voluntary insurance is offered to some groups. 
• Employers and employees pay the same percentage of the wage. The fee 
was originally set to 1 per cent of gross income, but is now fixed at 1,7 per 
cent. Retired people also contribute to the insurance. Civil servants 
(Beamte) get half of the insurance paid by their employer, and may 
complement it with private arrangements. 
• High-income earners – employees with an income above 6 500 DEM ($ 
3,000) per month – may choose to take private insurance instead.7 
• The LTC insurance also covers family members, who are included 
without having to pay extra contributions. 
• For people dependent on social assistance, the local authority concerned 
may choose between paying contributions and taking the risk of having to 
pay for care. 
• The insurance is administered by care funds that are formally independent 
from, but closely tied to, the already established sick funds (Schneider 
[1999]). There are about 400 sick funds (Krankenkassen). 
Being a PAYG system, the LTC insurance did not build up more than a small 
buffer fund. According to the law, this fund must exceed the payments of 1.5 months, 
and at the moment it contains about twice that amount. 
3.3 Benefits 
It takes five years to qualify for benefits. Except for that, the only requisite to 
qualify is need for care, so benefits are paid independent of age. Three kinds of 
benefits are offered: professional domiciliary care, institutional care as well as 
benefits in cash. Different kinds of benefits may also be combined. Benefits are not 
dependent on the income of the patient. 
                                                 
6
 Pay as You Go. 
7
 To be correct, this option actually concerns the public health insurance. All of those who have a 
public health insurance – be it voluntary or not – are obliged to sign up for the LTC insurance. 
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Two principles guide the choice of benefits. Firstly, preventive and 
rehabilitating measures are preferred to plain care. Secondly, domiciliary care is to be 
given priority above institutional care. This is in accordance with the objective to 
enable the elderly to stay as long as possible at home. 
The aim with benefits in cash is to support private, family-based 
arrangements. This kind of support is much lower than the payments to professional 
caregivers. 
To control spending, there is also a rule stating that the insurers may not spend 
more than 30,000 DEM ($ 13,700) per year on one single client. 
Originally, the aim was to make benefits match the condition of the individual 
as well as possible. However, negotiating benefit schemes proved to be a difficult 
task, and a provisional solution was implemented, that distinguishes only three levels 
of need. The intention was to replace this system at the end of 1997, but it is still in 
use (Evers [1998]). 
People applying for benefits are examined by a doctor and then divided into 
three groups. The critical factors are the person’s ability to perform activities of daily 
living (ADL), as well as the time that these activities are estimated to consume. 
Mental impairments are not taken into account.8 The minimum need for eligibility to 
benefits is 1.5 hours per day. The three classes are defined as follows: 
I. Clients, who need help with at least two activities at least 90 minutes a 
day and who need help with cooking or shopping at least two times a 
week. 
II. Clients, who need help at least three times a day, and also need help with 
cooking and shopping at least two times a week. 
III. Clients, who have a need for care at least five hours a day, where at least 
four of them are due to basic personal care, and who need help with 
cooking and shopping. 
Benefits for different classes are described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Monthly Benefits from the LTC Insurance. German Marks 
 Cash Benefit Domiciliary Care Institutional Care 
Category I 400 750 2 000 
750* 
Category II 800 1 800 2 500 
1 800* 
Category III 1 300 2 800 
3 750** 
2 800 
3 000** 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. 
                                                 
8
 The German government has recently passed a law that will ease the situation of clients with 
‘extensive need’ – i.e. normally persons with mental impairments. The law, which comes into force in 
2002, allocates some 500 million DEM to special benefits for this group. 
*
 Part-time care. 
**
 Severe cases. 
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In some cases, the insurers will pay less than the amounts listed in Table 1. 
Firstly, an insurer may not pay more than 2,500 DEM ($ 1,150) per client on average 
(outliers not included). Secondly, expenses for severe cases may not exceed 3 per cent 
of total expenditure in category III. Thirdly, the law states that the client shall 
contribute with at least 25 per cent of the fee for institutional care herself, which may 
lead to less than the standard amount being paid, especially in cheap nursing homes 
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung/BMAS [2000], p. 50). 
3.4 Coverage 
At the end of 1999, 71.37 million people were covered by the public LTC 
insurance. At the same time, 8.13 million had signed up for private insurance. Thus, 
about 90 per cent of the population is part of the mandatory scheme. The responsible 
ministry estimates the number of non-insured to about 300 000 – 500 000 people. 
This group mainly consists of small business owners, that chose not to get insured, as 
well as some social assistance recipients (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit [2000]). 
About 1.92 million receive benefits from the insurance. 1.35 million of these 
get domiciliary care, whereas 0.57 million stay in nursing homes. Among those who 
are cared for at home, 52.2 per cent are subsumed to category I, 36.9 per cent to 
category II and 10.9 per cent to category III. For those getting institutional care, the 
corresponding shares are 37.4 per cent for category I, 41.5 per cent for category II and 
21.1 per cent for category III. 
Table 2 shows the age and sex distribution of LTC insurance beneficiaries. It 
might be noted that the LTC insurance is not solely concentrated on elderly people, 
since almost 20 per cent of its beneficiaries are below retirement age. Nevertheless, 
the risk of being in need of long term care is highly age-dependent; rising from 0.5 
per cent among people in working age to some 32 per cent for people who have 
reached the age of 80 (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit [2000]). 
 
Table 2. Age and sex distribution of benefit recipients 
 Age groups   
Year - 20 20 – 55 55 –60 60 –65 65 –70 70 – 75 75 – 80 80 –85 85 –90 90+ Total Men Women
                           
1995 6.9 10.9 3.3 4.4 6.4 9.4 9.8 18.8 19.0 11.0 100.0 35.6 64.4 
1996 5.2 9.1 3.1 4.1 5.9 8.8 11.3 18.4 21.1 13.0 100.0 31.2 68.8 
1997 5.2 10.1 3.1 4.3 5.8 8.5 12.5 16.1 21.0 13.4 100.0 31.6 68.4 
1998 5.1 10.4 3.0 4.5 5.6 8.6 13.7 14.0 21.1 14.0 100.0 31.7 68.3 
1999 5.1 10.4 2.8 4.5 5.7 8.6 14.0 13.1 21.0 14.6 100.0 31.8 68.2 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the distribution of clients over different kinds of benefits. It 
should be noted that more than fifty per cent of clients get benefits in cash, but also 
that institutional care has been gaining importance ever since it was introduced in 
1996. Even within category III, a remarkably high share of clients chooses the cash 
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benefit. The reason for this pattern has been debated ever since the insurance was 
introduced. Evers [1998] points out some factors; e g that this kind of benefit is the 
most suitable to German family structures. Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
these benefits are not as close substitutes as was originally presumed. 
 
Table 3. Shares of different kinds of benefits 
 Type of Benefit 
Year Cash Domiciliary Combination Respite 
Part-
Time 
Short-
Time Institutional 
Institutional; 
disabled Total 
1995 83.0 7.7 7.7 1.0 0.2 0.3 - - 100.0 
1996 60.4 6.8 8.7 0.4 0.2 0.4 22.7 0.4 100.0 
1997 56.3 6.9 9.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 24.6 2.2 100.0 
1998 53.6 7.5 9.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 25.2 3.2 100.0 
1999 52.0 8.1 10.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 25.7 2.9 100.0 
Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. 
 
The LTC insurance has a yearly turnover of about 32 billion DEM ($ 14.9 
bn.), which works out at less than one per cent of GDP. The development of costs for 
the social LTC insurance and the LTC-related social assistance costs is pictured in 
Figure 1. Most of the years since the LTC insurance was introduced, it had a small 
surplus that could be transferred to the reserve. Since 1999, though, there has been a 
small deficit, and the financial position is not expected to improve before the middle 
of this decade. 
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Figure 1. German LTC Costs. 
Sources: BMAS & Bundesministerium für Gesundheit. 
 
Since the introduction of the insurance, the costs for care-related social 
assistance have decreased considerably. In 1994, social assistance costs to this end 
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amounted to almost 13 billion DEM, whereas in 1997 the corresponding figure was 5 
billion DEM. Since other social assistance costs were more or less constant during the 
same time, care-related costs actually shrunk from one third to one eighth of the social 
assistance budget in only three years. 
Besides reducing social assistance expenditures, the LTC insurance has 
relieved the pressure on the health insurance significantly. Firstly, special funds 
designed for particularly needy – amounting to 3.5 billion DEM – were transferred to 
the LTC insurance. Secondly, due to the expansion of institutional care, the number of 
hospital beds could be reduced, and so another 2.7 billion DEM were saved. These 
figures are not included in Figure 1. 
Despite these positive changes, the LTC insurance did not lessen the social 
assistance dependency among elderly to the degree that was originally intended. This 
goes in particular for clients of institutional care, where the number of social 
assistance recipients has not even halved since the introduction of the LTC insurance. 
In 1997, 185 000 clients in institutional care – about 40 per cent of that group – 
received social assistance. The reason for this high share is that clients in nursing 
homes are charged extensive fees for food and accommodation. On the other hand, 
the need for social assistance among those who stay at home is significantly lower. 
3.5 The supply side 
The LTC insurance has been constructed along the lines of the mandatory 
health insurance, where competing sick funds provide insurance. Each fund is 
required to have a separate organisation for the LTC insurance. Those who already 
have a health insurance automatically get their LTC insurance at the same fund. 
In addition to the public sick funds, there are private insurance companies that 
offer the same kind of insurance for those who are not part of the mandatory scheme. 
These companies are obliged to offer insurance that is equivalent to the public one 
(BMAS [2000]). One important difference, though, is that the premiums of private 
LTC insurance are not related to income, but to the age of the insured when signing 
up for insurance. 
The public sick funds sign contracts with care providers. These have to be 
either non-profit nursing homes or private companies. The law forbids discrimination 
of the latter. In cases where the client is entitled to domiciliary or institutional care, 
the benefit from the insurance turns into a ‘voucher’ that is transferred directly to the 
caregiver. 
If the client chooses a benefit in cash, she gets it herself, but is expected to be 
able to prove that it is used for care. The sick funds are obliged to examine the 
situation of the client at a regular basis. Care provided by family members is 
acknowledged in the public pension and work injury insurance, as well as in some 
labour market programmes that are based on working experience. 
There are over 11 000 units – private companies and non-profit organisations 
– that offer domiciliary care. Only a small share (4 per cent) is provided by public 
caregivers. Most of the institutions that are supplying domiciliary care were already 
on the market when the LTC insurance was introduced. Among start-ups, private 
companies are dominating. Most caregivers are small; 17 per cent have less than five 
employees (Schneekloth & Müller [2000]). 
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The introduction of the LTC insurance incurred a quite drastic structural 
change within the institutional care system. Most of the institutions that were present 
before the introduction of the insurance have adapted to the new system and signed 
contracts with the sick funds. Only 6 per cent of the about 8 000 caregivers have 
entered the market after 1996. The capacity seems to be large enough for the current 
needs. 
3.6 Discussion 
The German LTC insurance has strong support; clients in institutional as well 
as domiciliary care expressed a high level of satisfaction in a recent survey. It also 
seems to have achieved its objectives to at least some extent. The fact that more than 
70 per cent of those eligible opt for home care is a strong indication that the new 
insurance promotes this kind of care. On the other hand, the insurance has not been 
able to reduce dependence on social assistance as much as intended. Since the 
remaining social assistance costs mainly are due to outlays on lodging and food – that 
the LTC insurance is not meant to cover – this problem might just as well be 
attributed to the pension system, that lacks a basic pension component. 
The third objective – to increase the number of professional providers – also 
seems to have been accomplished to some degree. However, states (Länder) have 
been reluctant to provide the necessary infrastructure. Furthermore, there are still 
shortages of labour in the LTC market – despite the increase by some 75,000 
employees between 1993 and 1996 the lack has been estimated to around 150,000 
persons (Schneider [1999]). 
The German LTC insurance has been criticised for strengthening the division 
between acute and long-term care, a division that is claimed to becoming outdated 
from medical and geriatric points of view (Schneider [1999]). However, the close 
relationship between sick funds and care funds could lessen the incentives to cost 
shifting induced by this division. On the other hand, the fact that a customer has to be 
member of the care fund corresponding to his sick fund surely reduces the 
competition among care funds. This problem is augmented by the fact that care funds 
are not allowed to compete by price, which is allowed in the social health insurance 
(Greiner & v.d. Schulenburg [1996]). 
It is doubtful whether the German LTC insurance represents an optimal 
solution. It has been claimed that the new insurance borrows too many features from 
existing social insurances and entails too little innovation (Greiner & v.d. 
Schulenburg [1996]). One aspect that might be criticised is the fact that the 
government does not exhaust its relative advantage in offering catastrophic risk 
coverage, but restricts its involvement to offering indemnity insurance. Since 
insurance policies like this would have been available in the private market in any 
case, it might have been more appropriate if the social insurance system would have 
covered costs above a certain threshold instead. 
On the other hand, the German solution will limit moral hazard problems. The 
caps put on benefits imply that the marginal cost faced by clients not on social 
assistance equals the actual price. This would serve to limit ex ante as well as ex post 
moral hazard. The formalised procedure for assessing need also restricts the 
possibilities of the client to demand more care than actually needed. 
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To sum up, the German LTC scheme offers a substantial relief to disabled as 
well as informal carers, without changing the basic property of the German welfare 
state that LTC is essentially a private responsibility. With the new LTC insurance, the 
German system will be more sustainable in the demographic setting that is expected 
for the next decades. 
4. Japan 
4.1 Background 
Since Japan got industrialised quite late, it also developed social security 
systems after most other developed countries. A poverty law was introduced in 1874. 
Another important milestone in the history of the Japanese welfare state was the 
introduction of a national health insurance in 1922. Moreover, a pension system for 
workers was introduced in 1941. 
It was not until after World War II, though, that the development toward a 
modern welfare state began. The 1947 Constitution stipulates that all Japanese 
citizens have a right to enjoy a minimum standard of living. A government council on 
social security was established in 1950, and in the next years, a coherent – although 
mainly supplementary – public welfare system began to develop. A Child Welfare 
Law was adopted in 1947 and a Welfare Law for Handicapped in 1949. These laws 
were followed by a social assistance law (1950) and a social service law (1951). 
In the 1960s, the aim in welfare policy was to go “from selective to universal” 
measures and “from relief to prevention”. Health and pension insurances were 
reformed in 1961. After that, the national health insurance system covers all Japanese 
(Maruo [1997]). Nevertheless, social security expenditure remained very low by 
international standards, amounting to only 7 per cent in 1970, and the family 
remained the most important provider of social security. 
In the 1970s, Japan began a slow process of catching up with other developed 
countries in term of social security spending. Public expenditures increased, including 
social services such as medical care and personal social services. The share of social 
security expenditure in GDP amounted to 11.4 per cent in 1985 and increased to 14.1 
per cent in 1996 (the corresponding OECD averages were 20.6 and 23.9 per cent; ILO 
[2000]). This process was partly driven by an ageing of the population that was 
noticeable already in the seventies and partly by the well-known phenomenon that the 
public sector tends to grow in developed countries. 
For elderly, an important step was taken in 1973, when medical care was made 
free for all aged 70 and older; social services remained means-tested, though. As a 
consequence, the number of hospitalised elderly increased rapidly in the next twenty 
years, and most of these stayed in hospitals paid by medical insurance (Campbell & 
Ikegami [2000]). 
At the end of the eighties, there was increased political concern regarding 
long-term care for elderly. Japan at this time already had one of the oldest populations 
in the world, and there were no signs of a halt of this process. At the same time, the 
informal care sector, that was one of the pillars of Japanese social security, went into 
a crisis. Family patterns changed in a way that made traditional arrangements 
impossible. 
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To remedy these problems, the Japanese government presented a Gold Plan in 
1989 that laid down a ten-year strategy for long-term care. The government was 
aiming at an ambitious expansion of services: targets were set for nursing homes as 
well as home and day-care services. After this, Japan experienced a rapid growth in 
the formal care sector; costs increased by 10-15 per cent per year, and the ambitious 
targets set up in the Gold Plan were actually raised in 1994 (Campbell & Ikegami 
[2000]). 
With a growing care sector, it became obvious that the financing system 
needed reform too. In 1997, following a long discussion, a mandatory long-term care 
insurance was passed in the Japanese parliament. The insurance represents a radical 
break with Japanese welfare traditions, since it entitles all insured to benefits and thus 
shifts the responsibility for long-term care from families to the state. The insurance 
was introduced in April 2000 and will expand gradually during the next ten years 
(Campbell & Ikegami [2000]). 
4.2 Financing 
The LTC insurance is financed by 50 per cent from taxes and by 50 per cent 
from insurance premiums. The tax revenues are collected by 50 per cent from national 
taxes, and local and regional taxes contribute with ¼ each. Premiums are collected 
from people aged 40 years and over. Family members are automatically covered 
(Edebalk & Svensson [2000]). For those in the working population, the premium 
amounts to 0.6 per cent of income up to a ceiling. Premiums are shared between the 
worker and his employer (Campbell & Ikegami [2001]). 
For elderly, premiums are deducted from pensions. These premiums are also 
income-related. There are five different premium levels, ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 of the 
‘standard premium’. The standard premium amounts to $ 26 per month on average 
(Tokyo Metropolitan Government [2000]). 
The LTC insurance is administered by the municipalities: there are 3,200 
entities. The local LTC budget, that is decided by the local authority, is based on 
forecasts of supply and demand. Premiums paid by the working population are 
collected at the national level and are then allocated according to a formula based on 
demographic and income characteristics. 
 In addition to the public financing, a co-payment is imposed on the part of the 
clients, amounting to 10 per cent of care costs. This co-payment may be reduced for 
clients who were already enjoying care free of charge at the time the insurance was 
introduced. 
4.3 Benefits 
Eligibility for benefits from the LTC insurance is solely based on need. Thus, 
the financial position and family structure of the insured are not taken into account. 
The LTC insurance covers institutional as well as home-based care, and clients in all 
categories except the least needy may choose between them. There are three kinds of 
institutions: former social service nursing homes, formerly health-insurance financed 
homes for elderly and medical nursing care facilities. Home care services included are 
nursing care, rehabilitation, medical advice and various community services. 
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Furthermore, short-term stays in institutions as well as grants for home rebuilding are 
offered (Tokyo Metropolitan Government [2000]). 
There is no benefit in cash. There were several reasons why a cash benefit was 
not included. Firstly, there was a wish among women to break old family patterns. 
Secondly, the government wanted to achieve a gradual expansion of LTC services, 
and there was a belief that more people would apply for cash benefits than for in-kind 
benefits. Thirdly, one aim of the reform was to expand the infrastructure of LTC, and 
the existence of a cash benefit might hamper such a process (Campbell & Ikegami 
[2001]). 
The LTC insurance is mainly designed for elderly people; persons aged 40-65 
are entitled to benefits only if they suffer from age-related diseases (e. g. 
Alzheimer’s). 
The method to assess need is quite sophisticated. The physical as well as 
mental status is examined in a survey consisting of 85 items, each with 3-4 levels. 
This survey is processed by a computer program that assigns a level of need to the 
client on a six-grade scale. The result of the assessment is further supervised by an 
expert group, consisting of personnel with medical as well as social expertise. The 
level of need is to be re-evaluated every six months (Edebalk & Svensson [2000]). If 
the client is not satisfied with the assessment, appeal to a regional body may be made 
(Tokyo Metropolitan Government [2000]). 
Benefits cover actual costs (less the 10 per cent co-payment) up to a certain 
limit. Limits for home care are calculated according to a point system, where a 
number of points is assigned to each type of service. The points are multiplied by a 
certain yen amount, to get the actual benefit limit for different levels of need. One 
estimate of maximum benefits is given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Limits of Monthly Home Care Benefits 
Benefit Limit Level of Need 
¥ $ 
# of Short-Stay Days 
(per six months) 
Requires Assistance 61,500 504 7 
Requires Nursing Care 1 165,800 1,358 14 
Requires Nursing Care 2 194,800 1,596 14 
Requires Nursing Care 3 267,500 2,192 21 
Requires Nursing Care 4 306,000 2,507 21 
Requires Nursing Care 5 358,300 2,936 42 
 Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 
 
In institutions, costs vary between ¥ 242,000 ($ 2,000) and 414,000 ($ 3,400) 
per month depending on the type of facility and the amount of nursing care needed. 
Meals, amounting to approximately ¥ 22,000 ($ 180) per month, are not reimbursed 
by the LTC insurance (Tokyo Metropolitan Government [2000]). 
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4.4 Coverage 
The new insurance scheme involves about 43 million of the working 
population, and 22 million retired. The rest of the population, some 61 million people, 
are only affected by the taxes charged to finance part of the program. 
In 1995, 6.0 per cent of the elderly population were cared for in institutions,9 
and 5 per cent were receiving formal help at home (OECD [1999]). Throughout the 
nineties, the number of clients in nursing homes was increasing rapidly. According to 
Table 5, the number of clients in institutions increased by 43 per cent between 1993 
and 1999. 
 
Table 5. Number of Cliemts in different kinds of Institutions, 1993-1999 
Year Nursing Homes 
for the Aged 
Special Nursing 
Homes for the 
Aged 
Low-Cost Homes 
for the Aged 
Total % of 
65+ 
1993 64,854 192,719 19,036 276,822 1.65% 
1994 64,569 205,729 21,363 291,924 1.66% 
1995 64,263 218,769 24,465 307,912 1.69% 
1996 64,446 234,946 30,326 330,279 1.74% 
1997 64,584 250,482 35,728 351,518 1.78% 
1998 64,553 264,937 41,568 372,025 1.82% 
1999 64,450 281,060 49,202 396,338 1.88% 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare 
 
Estimates for 2000 show that 12.4 per cent of the elderly population – 2.7 
million persons – would be eligible for benefits if they applied. However, the 
government has been quite optimistic in its forecasts of how many people will 
actually apply for benefits: 705,000 persons who live in institutions and 650,000 
living at home were assumed to apply the first year. Thus, 1.35 million beneficiaries 
were expected, making up only 6.2 per cent of the elderly. In the long run, though, it 
is assumed that at least 80 per cent of beneficiaries will sign up (Campbell & Ikegami 
[2000]). 
The insurance has now been running for more than a year, and it seems like 
the government’s estimates of utilisation have been fairly accurate so far. An account 
is made in Table 6. 
                                                 
9
 This figure includes a considerable number of elderly occupying hospital beds. 
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Table 6. Estimates and actual Certified and Receiving LTC Benefits (thousands) 
 Estimated Actual 
 August, 1999 April, 2000 October, 2000 
Certified to be eligible 2,689 2,162 2,473 
Receiving LTCI benefits 2,689 1,489 1,921 
Community Care 1,984 971 1,297 
Institutional Care (total) 705 518 624 
Nursing Homes 304 245 283 
Health Facilities for Elderly 205 188 220 
Hospital LTC Beds 197 75 102 
 Source: Campbell & Ikegami [2001] 
 
 The LTC market for elderly was estimated to have a total turnover of ¥ 8.4 
trillion ($ 70 billion) in the year 2000. This corresponds to around 1.5 per cent of 
GDP. The bulk of this is financed by public institutions (Ogawa [2001]). 
4.5 The Supply Side 
In 1999, there were 21,820 institutions offering care for the aged. Among 
these, some 8,000 were institutions offering permanent accommodation, 7,400 were 
offering daily services, there were 5,600 support centres and a few institutions (79) 
specialised on short-stay care. The expansion of long-term care that has taken place 
according to the Gold Plan is considerable: in 1993 there were less than 9,000 
institutions offering long-term care (Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
[2001]). 
Until recently, private companies have not been allowed to operate nursing 
homes. Consequently, this sector has been dominated by voluntary non-profit 
organisations. According to a survey from 1996, 90 per cent of nursing homes were 
managed by non-profit organisations and the rest by local authorities. Even today, 
about 98 per cent of the beds are provided by public or non-profit organisations 
(Ogawa [2001]). 
In community care, the picture is somewhat more mixed. Even in this case, 
non-profit and public providers have been dominating traditionally, but since the late 
80s the number of private providers has increased. Private providers have the largest 
market share in services like ‘meals on wheels’ and transport service. According to 
figures from 1997, 5.6 per cent of home care service providers are private, 50.4 per 
cent are public and 33.8 are non-profit organisations (Ogawa [2001]). 
When the private LTC insurance was introduced, several large for-profit 
corporations made huge investments in home services in the anticipation of increased 
demand due to the increased freedom to choose providers. However, recipients have 
proved to be more conservative than expected, and stayed with their former providers. 
This has incurred some losses on private corporations offering home care (Campbell 
& Ikegami [2001]). 
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4.6 Discussion 
The Japanese LTC insurance represents an important break with Japanese 
traditions, and as such it is an interesting experiment. The design of the insurance is 
different to the German one in several respects; 1) it offers almost complete 
compensation and not just indemnity insurance, 2) its procedure for assessment of 
need is more sophisticated and 3) it only reimburses formal care. 
These characteristics imply that the Japanese system solves some of the 
problems connected with LTC insurance. The almost complete coverage offered 
would certainly be preferred by risk-averse individuals to the partial coverage of the 
German system. Furthermore, the fact that the insurance is mandatory eliminates 
problems like adverse selection and free-riding. The problem of moral hazard will 
also be reduced due to the careful assessment procedure as well as the 10 per cent co-
payment. The latter also encourages the individual to use cost-effective services. 
On the other hand, the Japanese system might grow very costly (Mayhew 
[2001]). Japan is going to face a tremendous increase in the number of elderly, and as 
the retired population grows more and more wealthy, the 10 per cent co-payment 
might become less and less restrictive. Thus, a considerable increase in aggregate 
costs, albeit from a low level, may be expected over the next few decades. Since the 
working population is estimated to decline at the same time, the relative burden of 
LTC will grow even more. The risk of a rapid increase in costs is further augmented 
by the fact that informal care is not reimbursed at all, thus making formal care more 
attractive in comparison. 
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of LTC services brings about some 
problems. Since there is a shortage of qualified workers in municipalities, assessment 
of need as well as care management is often delegated to providers. Consequently, 
incompatible tasks are sometimes carried out by the same person. This practice 
certainly threatens the integrity and objectivity of the assessment procedure. There is 
an incentive to up-code clients and to suggest only services that are provided by the 
own company. This could lead to an inadequate allocation of resources as well as an 
upsurge of costs. 
5. Sweden 
5.1 Background 
Up to the first half of the last century, long-term care in Sweden was provided 
almost exclusively by families. Only for those lacking family members and financial 
means, municipalities offered care in public poorhouses. 
Starting in the late 1940s, the public involvement in long-term care evolved 
from being aimed at poor elderly to a more general approach. Municipalities were 
obliged to offer care in nursing homes. This shift in responsibilities was followed by a 
revision of the law in 1956, after which adult children had no formal responsibilities 
for their parents. 
Around 1950, the Swedish economy got overheated, and social reforms were 
brought to a standstill. Consequently, no more public nursing homes were built. To 
compensate for this, volunteer organisations started offering domiciliary care. This 
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care was not means-tested, but offered to all elderly in regions where these 
organisations were operating. 
It soon turned out, though, that the volunteer organisations would not be able 
to carry out the expansion needed in domiciliary care. Thus, over the next decade, 
municipalities overtook ever more responsibility – from volunteer organisations as 
well as from family members. After government grants for domiciliary care had been 
introduced in 1964, a rapid expansion of these services took place (Söderström et al 
[2001]). 
The public provision of domiciliary care peaked in 1978, with 352 000 clients. 
The number of places in public nursing homes reached its peak at about the same 
time. After that, the expansion of earlier decades has been reversed. In the 80s a 
retreat of public involvement in long-term care was driven by a marked improvement 
in the health status of elderly, improved living conditions as well as the awareness 
that there had been some oversupply in the 70s. 
In the 90s, Sweden went through its deepest recession since the 30s. The 
economic crisis caused severe financial problems in the public sector. As a 
consequence, the reductions in public provision of long-term care continued, and care 
was concentrated on the most needy. At the same time, the Swedish model with 
public monopolies was challenged, and some municipalities introduced 
purchaser/provider organisations as well as voucher systems for domiciliary care. 
During the nineties, the share of private caregivers doubled. 
5.2 Financing 
Swedish long-term care is mainly financed by local income taxes. These taxes 
are the general income taxes charged by municipalities at a flat rate, averaging 20.57 
per cent this year. Only a small share of the expenditures on long-term care is 
financed through out-of-pocket payments; according to the latest estimate by the 
government, this share is now approximately 5 per cent. Despite this, long-term care 
fees of different kinds make up a considerable share of the income for many elderly. 
In addition to local taxes and out-of-pocket payments, the central government 
contributes to the financing of long-term care in three ways. Firstly, general 
government grants are paid to municipalities. This grant amounts to about SEK 50 bn. 
in 2001 (i.e. 2.5 per cent of GDP or SEK 6,000 per inhabitant ($ 590)). Secondly, an 
age-related grant is paid, that amounts to SEK 6.7 bn. this year. Thirdly, there is a 
specific “cost adjustment” system for compensating municipalities with unfavourable 
demographic structures. A rough sketch of the principles of this system will be given 
below. In total, government grants make up 14.5 per cent of municipalities’ incomes 
(Swedish Association of Local Authorities/SALA [2001]). 
The principles for out-of-pocket payments are regulated by law. In the law, it 
is stated that municipalities are allowed to charge fees for home-based as well as 
institution-based services. The freedom to design the fee structure is constrained by 
some principles. These principles are that fees should be fair, they may not exceed 
production cost, and they must leave a personal expenses allowance (“pocket 
money”). 
There are no guidelines regarding fairness, but one practice is to enable the 
client to keep his ordinary flat some time after moving to a nursing home (SALA 
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[1997]). Since the share of out-of-pocket payments is so low, the production cost 
principle rarely is applicable. The personal expenses allowance shall guarantee that 
the client has a net income sufficient not only for personal needs but also for housing 
and health care costs. One target mentioned in the relevant government bill is that it 
should not be necessary to rely on social assistance to pay for health and long-term 
care. 
In 1993, the rules applying to long-term care fees were changed, granting the 
municipalities a higher degree of freedom in designing the fee structures. This is a 
freedom that has been used; all municipalities have changed their rules since then 
(SALA [1997]). In practice, four different designs are being used: 
• Flat-rate fee. Everybody pays the same amount regardless of personal 
income and quantity of services consumed. 
• Income-related fee. 
• Fee related to consumption. Fees may be fixed with reference to 
number of visit, duration of visits, specified services et c. 
• Income- and consumption-related fee. 
Studies that have been made show that there are massive differences between 
the municipalities with respect to out-of-pocket payments. These differences also 
seem to have increased over time. Furthermore, there are increasing differences in the 
charge for the same service within municipalities. This is due to the fact that ever 
more fees are income-related, and that the progressivity in these fees tends to increase 
(National Board of Health and Welfare [2000]). 
To compensate municipalities with an unfavourable situation regarding the 
demographic structure, population density and other factors outside the municipality’s 
own control, a system of risk adjustment is used, that redistributes resources between 
municipalities. 
The risk adjustment system takes the variables age, sex, civil status and 
professional background into account. On top of that, it compensates for a high 
proportion of immigrants among the elderly, as well as for climate factors. The 
system has been criticised for several reasons; it is claimed to give municipalities 
perverse incentives, there are data problems in the cost calculations that make the 
outcome biased; furthermore, the climate factor is suspected to bring a political bias 
into the system since in Sweden, climate and political majorities exhibit a striking 
correlation (Karlsson et al [2000]). 
5.3 Benefits 
The responsibilities of municipalities as regards LTC are regulated in the 
Social Services Act. It states that everybody who is in need has a right to home-based 
or institution-based care. Municipalities are further obliged to actively investigate 
needs in the local population, and to promote good living conditions in other ways. 
The Social Services Act explicitly states that it shall be made possible for elderly to 
stay at home and live independently as long as possible (Karlsson et al [2000]). 
Municipalities offer home help services, daytime community activities and 
similar social services to assist elderly living at home. Since 1992 municipalities also 
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are responsible for local nursing homes and some other care institutions. At the same 
time, a new general term was introduced for all kinds of accommodating institutions 
under the responsibility of municipalities: special forms of accommodation. This term 
includes service flats, old peoples’ homes, sheltered housing and nursing homes. 
Furthermore, municipalities and county councils have a mutual responsibility for 
rehabilitation and providing technical aids (National Board of Health and Welfare 
[2000a]). 
Despite its high degree of reliance on formal care, the amount of informal care 
being provided in Sweden is considerable. It has been estimated that the amount of 
help given by relatives to older people living at home is more than twice the amount 
given by local authorities. To support such care, municipalities in some cases employ 
the carer, or offer the client a grant to pay relatives for care at home (National Board 
of Health and Welfare [2000a]). 
5.4 Coverage 
Since municipalities are obliged to provide long-term care for everybody in 
need, the whole Swedish population is covered by the public system. Despite this, the 
increased mobility among elderly has posed some problems to the Swedish system 
lately.  
In the year 2000, about 250 000 people 65 years of age and older received 
some kind of long-term care, corresponding to 16.1 per cent of the entire elderly 
population. It is apparent that the need for care is highly age-related even among the 
elderly; among those 80 years of age and older not less than 39.7 per cent received 
some kind of long-term care last year. The trends over the 90s are pictured in. It is 
clear that the trend to scale down public long-term care has continued during the 
nineties. Furthermore, the share of LTC going to the oldest group has increased 
throughout the period. 
 In domiciliary care, a restructuring has been observed in the nineties, where 
efforts have been concentrated to the most severe cases. Thus, the number of elderly 
with weekly services amounting to 1-9 hours a month decreased significantly, 
whereas the share with services exceeding 50 hours increased. In Table 8, a 
comparison between 1992 and 1997 makes this clear. These trends have been 
accentuated after 1997 (National Board of Health and Welfare [2001]). 
 Thus, in the nineties there have been two counteracting trends in domiciliary 
care; firstly, a trend to decrease the number of recipients, and secondly, a trend to 
concentrate on severe cases. The net effect, at least in the last few years, has been 
positive – between 1998 and 2000 the total number of service hours increased by 3.3 
per cent (National Board of Health and Welfare [2001]). 
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Table 7. Recipients of Long-Term Care in Sweden 1993-2000 
Source: National Board of Health And Welfare [2001]. 
 
Table 8. Trends in Domiciliary Care between 1992 and 1997 
 1992 1997 1992-1997 
Hours/ 
month 
N % N % ∆N ∆% Rel. 
change 
(%) 
1-9 74,935 40.1 57,651 35.7 -17,284 -4.4 -23 
10-49 48,633 26.0 38,869 24.1 -9,764 -1.9 -20 
50-119 30,599 16.4 27,445 17.0 -3,154 +0.6 -10 
120-199 26,197 14.0 30,024 18.6 +3,827 +4.6 +15 
200- 6,489 3.5 7,582 4.7 +1,093 +1.2 +17 
Source: National Board of Health and Welfare [2001]. 
 
 The figures presented so far conceal the fact that there are considerable 
differences between municipalities as regards coverage and general focus of long-
term care services. Table 9 shows the coverage of long-term care in municipalities 
with the highest and the lowest cost per elderly. As might be noted, costs also vary 
significantly, and the differences are not completely attributable to differences in need 
(Karlsson et al [2000]). 
 The total cost for publicly financed long-term care was SEK 63.8 bn. ($ 6.2 
bn.) in 1999 (3.2 per cent of GDP). Out of this, the main part was made up by 
institution-based care (73.7 per cent); home-based care accounted for 24.1 per cent 
and taxi services 2.1 per cent. Throughout the nineties, the share of institution-based 
care has increased, and the share of taxi services has decreased significantly (Swedish 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs [1999]). 
 Age 65- Age 80- 
Year Domi-
ciliary 
care 
% Insti-
tution-
based 
care 
% Total % Domi-
ciliary 
care 
% Insti-
tution-
based 
care 
% Total % 
1993 149,650 9.7 121,340 7.9 270,990 17.6 92,181 23.2 89,433 22.5 181,614 45.7 
1994 145,034 9.4 128,553 8.4 273,587 17.8 90,665 22.2 94,855 23.2 185,520 45.5 
1995 137,572 8.9 129,843 8.4 267,415 17.3 86,653 20.9 96,058 23.2 182,711 44.1 
1996 129,543 8.4 127,012 8.2 256,555 16.6 82,956 19.7 94,509 22.5 177,465 42.2 
1997 130,059 8.4 130,725 8.5 260,784 16.9 84,788 19.8 97,715 22.9 182,503 42.7 
1998 126,049 8.2 118,715 7.7 244,764 15.9 84,253 19.5 90,787 21.0 175,040 40.5 
1999 129,479 8.4 116,254 7.6 245,733 16.0 85,217 19.5 88,623 20.3 173,840 39.8 
2000 125,324 8.2 121,305 7.9 246,629 16.1 86,070 19.0 93,717 20.7 179,787 39.7 
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Table 9. Cost and Coverage of Long-Term Care in some Swedish Municipalities 
1999 
Home-based Care 
Share of 
Population 
Institution-based 
Care 
Share of Population 
Share of 
Elderly in 
population 
Municipality 
Cost 
$10 per 
65+ 65-79 yrs 80-w yrs 65-79 yrs 80-w yrs 65-79 yrs 80-w yrs 
Gällivare 7,113 4.0 16.4 3.3 28.9 13.9 4.2 
Nordmaling 6,915 5.1 17.4 3.2 26.7 15.1 6.4 
Boden 6,845 2.8 12.8 2.9 25.9 13.3 4.9 
Kiruna 6,757 5.7 25.2 3.1 22.8 12.2 3.0 
Härjedalen 6,737 5.1 24.3 3.1 21.7 16.5 7.5 
        
Nat. average 4,983 3.5 18.3 2.6 21.6 13.5 5.3 
        
Nacka 3,350 4.4 21.2 1.4 12.5 9.2 3.5 
Båstad 3,345 1.5 14.1 1.5 17.5 16.1 7.2 
Håbo 3,283 2.7 25.3 3.7 29.5 6.7 1.4 
Järfälla 3,264 2.8 15.2 2.6 19.4 10.0 2.4 
Sigtuna 3,178 2.7 15.6 1.2 10.0 8.5 2.3 
Source: SALA (2000) 
 
 The Swedish system is designed so as to avoid having elderly dependent on 
social assistance. Thus, the national pension scheme, together with housing allowance 
– provides what is considered to be a satisfactory living standard for all elderly. 
Furthermore, it has been the intention of the legislator that out-of-pocket payments for 
long-term care should take the economic situation of the client into consideration, so 
that nobody has to rely on social assistance when consuming long-term care services. 
 Nevertheless, there has been increasing concern regarding a small group of 
elderly who are not sufficiently covered by the national pension scheme – that 
requires 40 years of residence to qualify for full pension. In 1998, 10 700 elderly 
(some 0.6 per cent of the retired population) were dependent on social assistance for 
10 months or more. Out of these, 94 per cent were immigrants. Moreover, the central 
government has noticed that the out-of-pocket payments in some municipalities leave 
too little for personal expenses and that they create perverse incentives. 
 To remedy these problems, some changes in the legislation have been 
announced recently. Firstly, the central government is introducing a new transfer 
scheme that will guarantee all elderly a sufficient minimum income. Secondly, the 
freedom for municipalities to design their local fee structures will be limited. A 
ceiling of 1,500 ($ 150) will be put on monthly payments. Furthermore, the personal 
expenses allowance will be regulated in law. 
                                                 
10
 Exchange Rate per 01.07.99: 0.11784. 
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5.5 The Supply Side 
Until the early nineties, Swedish long-term care was almost exclusively 
provided by local public monopolies. Private provision was limited to some 
complementary services like cleaning. There was also a broad political consensus that 
health and long-term care should be publicly provided. 
In the early nineties, private entrepreneurs were allowed into the market for 
long-term care. In the first few years, a rapid expansion of private care took place; the 
share of private entrepreneurs in the municipal budgets for long-term care quadrupled. 
This trend has continued at a somewhat slower pace throughout the nineties, and to 
date there are no signs of weakening (Söderström et al [2001]). 
The impact of this change becomes clear if the shares of clients who are 
served by private caregivers are studied. These figures, which are given in Table 10, 
show that private caregivers more than doubled their share after 1993. Some caution 
is required regarding the figures for 1998 and 1999, since data are not of the same 
quality as for other years. Thus, the development of private care might well have been 
monotonously increasing during the period. 
 
Table 10. Shares of Clients being assisted by Private Caregivers between 1993 
and 2000 
Year Home-based care Institution-based care 
1993 3.6 5.4 
1994 3.4 7.1 
1995 3.9 8.3 
1996 3.3 9.3 
1997 4.2 10.2 
1998 n.a. 9.8 
1999 6.0 9.7 
2000 7.3 11.6 
Source: National Board of Health and Welfare [2001]. 
 
However, there are vast regional differences also in this case. The emergence 
of private caregivers is restricted to metropolitan areas and some larger towns. This 
might be illustrated by the fact that last year, in the city of Stockholm, private 
caregivers were responsible for 39.0 per cent of institution clients, whereas the 
corresponding share was 6.6 per cent in Jönköping (117,000 inhabitants) and zero in 
the small town Eskilstuna (National Board of Health and Welfare [2001]). 
At the same time as private caregivers have acquired an ever larger share of 
the long-term care market, there has been a tendency to restructuring among these 
caregivers. Nowadays, the market is dominated by nine big companies that provide 
some 70 per cent of total private care. In the last few years, these companies have 
started to establish their own institutions, instead of simply assuming the management 
of public institutions. This trend has been coupled with a tendency to sign long-term 
contracts with municipalities, so that the business of private caregivers has become 
more predictable. 
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The introduction of private caregivers was motivated by the wish of local 
politicians to increase efficiency and to contain costs. The experiment seems to have 
been successful so far; cost-awareness obviously has increased in many 
municipalities. In the beginning, there was occasionally some worries that private 
caregivers would provide inadequate care, but the hair-rising examples presented in 
the press seem to have had more to do with bad contracting practices than with the 
private management in itself (Söderström et al [2001]). 
One aspect that has been neglected, though, is the freedom of choice of the 
individual client. So far, purchaser/provider-arrangements, which leave little scope for 
the client to choose his preferred provider, have been dominating completely. In 
recent years, though, some municipalities have launched voucher systems that give 
the client an option to choose between several private and public providers. One of 
the pioneers in this field is the prosperous Stockholm suburb Nacka that introduced a 
voucher system for home-based care already in the early nineties. The city of 
Stockholm has recently started to introduce an ambitious voucher system for home-
based as well as institution-based care. 
5.6 Discussion 
Three distinct trends have been observable in Swedish long-term care during 
the nineties. Firstly, public services are concentrated on the oldest and those with 
most need. Secondly, responsibility for care has been decentralised: from regional 
bodies to municipalities, and from municipalities to the families of the clients. 
Thirdly, the share of private caregivers has increased rapidly. These changes are 
mainly a response to the harsh economic conditions that the severe economic crisis of 
the nineties posed. The crisis does not seem to have represented a serious threat to 
Swedish welfare, though; Sweden still offers long-term care services more generously 
than other countries. 
The dominant role played by the local authorities implies that some problems 
of insurance markets – such as adverse selection – are avoided. At the same time, co-
payments of clients, that are normally related to the amount of services consumed – 
serve to reduce moral hazard and promote a rational allocation of resources. 
On the other hand, the low degree of competition in the LTC service sector 
probably leads to inefficiency. The motivation for the traditional reliance on public 
services in Sweden has been the ideological conviction that the same services should 
be offered to the whole population, regardless of financial status. However, the large 
and increasing differences between municipalities with respect to coverage of 
services, principles for calculating out-of-pocket payments and principles for 
assessing need, represent important deviations from this ideological standpoint. 
For the future, it is mainly the financing system that is being discussed. This is 
largely due to the restraints that an ageing population will put on this generous 
system, but also because local responsibility for LTC is considered to be outdated.  In 
a time where mobility is increasing rapidly, the Swedish system with local 
responsibility seems inadequate, not the least since public long-term care also 
represents an intergenerational transfer. Furthermore, the huge regional differences 
between municipalities are regarded to be inequitable. Since, finally, there is some 
concern that the cost adjustment system is inadequate, there have been several 
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proposals for national responsibility or social insurance solutions in the last few years 
(Karlsson et al [2000]). 
6. United States 
6.1 Background 
Contrary to common conceptions, the United States had a quite ambitious 
social welfare programme for elderly already around the last turn of the century. At 
this time, more than one quarter of federal expenditure was dedicated to pensions for 
Civil War veterans and their families. The reason why this programme often has been 
neglected is probably that these expenditures were disguised as military expenses. 
Despite this, the United States never developed a welfare state like ones in 
Western Europe. There might be several reasons for this, but the most important is 
probably the diversity of the American working class, as well as landmark decisions 
by the Supreme Court. Thus, one can distinguish three distinct social reform waves 
from a century otherwise characterised by widespread antipathy against generous 
welfare arrangements. 
The first reform wave was Franklin D Roosevelt’s New Deal, initiated in the 
early thirties. The New Deal built on three main pillars: the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration, providing benefits for unemployed; public works to reduce 
unemployment; and the Social Security Act of 1935, including unemployment 
insurance and a pension insurance that would eventually cover most working 
Americans. According to its left wing critics, the New Deal introduced the still 
characteristic distinction of American welfare between general social insurances and 
stigmatising social assistance programmes. 
The second reform wave started with Lyndon B Johnson’s War on Poverty 
that was initiated in 1964. One guiding principle in Johnson’s social reforms was to 
offer “a hand up, not a hand out”. Thus, reforms were mainly aimed at offering 
education and labour market programmes. At the same time, expenditures on social 
assistance programmes were allowed to increase. Furthermore, the Social Security 
Act was complemented by Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, two programmes 
designed to increase access to medical services. 
 At the beginning, the Medicaid programme was almost completely focused on 
institutional care. Since then, a marked increase in home care services has taken 
places. This expansion of home services has rather been the result of many 
incremental changes, than a comprehensive plan. 
 Long-term care makes up a small but increasing part of public spending in the 
United States. Interestingly, long-term care has turned Medicaid, originally a public 
programme aimed at the poor, into a programme of more general coverage (Carlson 
[2000]). 
6.2 Financing 
In the United States, funds for health and long-term care for elderly is 
provided from public as well as private sources. Public funding is granted by the 
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Medicaid and Medicare programmes; and the private element consists of private 
insurance as well as out-of-pocket payments. 
Medicaid is a tax-based programme designed for low-income earners. It 
covers hospital care as well as home care. To be entitled to benefits, one has to have 
insufficient financial means, defined as having income and assets low enough to 
qualify for Supplementary Security Income; i.e. earnings less than $ 532 per month 
and non-housing assets less than $ 2000 (Feder et al [2000]). The limits for eligibility, 
as well as the scope of services covered, are set on a state level and thus vary across 
states. In most states, Medicaid covers costs for residential care. Even if the Medicaid 
programme was not originally designed to concentrate on help to elderly, it has 
evolved into an important pillar for long-term care financing (Edebalk & Svensson 
[2000]). Because of the high cost of nursing home care, 2/3 of residents end up 
relying on Medicaid. 
Medicare is a national social insurance programme. Contributions are paid 
either as ‘Medicare tax’ while working, or by completing premiums after retirement. 
The Medicare tax amounts to 2.9 per cent of yearly income: half of it is paid by the 
employer and half by the employee. There is no upper limit to the tax base. 
The Medicare premium amounts to $300 per month this year, or $165 for 
those individuals having 30-39 quarters of Medicare covered employment. To be 
entitled to benefits from Medicare, one has to contribute for 40 quarters. A majority of 
the workforce does not pay any premium, though, since they or their spouses already 
have 40 or more quarters of Medicare covered employment. Furthermore, those who 
are eligible for premium-free hospital insurance in other ways do not have to pay 
Medicare premium. The Part B premium is $50 per month (Health Care Financing 
Administration/HCFA [2001]). 
In recent years, a private market for long-term care insurance has emerged in 
the United States. Private insurance companies – there are more than 100 of them – 
offer complementary insurance for costs related to long-term care. These insurances 
are designed for cases where benefits from Medicare have been exhausted, and where 
the insured is not entitled to Medicaid benefits. Insurance is voluntary, and has 
normally been taken out individually. 
Before signing up, the policyholder goes through a medical examination. The 
insurance company also requests information regarding the customer’s consumption 
of medical services, his or her lifestyle and physical or psychical disabilities, if any. 
Contributions are based on these data, and sometimes they become prohibitive. 
Estimates show that as much as 20 per cent of the elderly population would be refused 
long-term care insurance (Edebalk & Svensson [2000]). 
In 1997, individual policies without an inflation adjustment feature ranged in 
cost from about $250 per year to more than $3,900. Inflation adjustments can add 40 
percent to 140 percent to that premium, depending on the option one selects, but they 
keep benefits in line with rising costs. Costs vary considerably with age; for a 50-
year-old, a policy offering a $100 per day nursing home benefit for four years, with a 
20-day deductible, would cost about $364 per year. For someone who was 65 years 
old, the same policy cost about $980, and for a 79-year-old, the cost would be $3,907 
(Health Insurance Association of America/HIAA [1999]). 
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6.3 Benefits 
In most states, Medicaid covers nursing home costs. Regarding home and 
community care, there are differing standards. The law only obliges states to offer 
home health care; personal services are optional. Some state Medicaid programs do 
not offer these services (Amaradio [1998]). Since 1994, states have quite wide-
ranging freedom to “waive” certain federal rules – i.e. limit access, target on selected 
areas or groups – in providing personal services (Feder et al [2000]). Most states use 
this freedom and target services such as home modification, homemaker services, 
habilitation and respite care to low-income elderly (Lutzky et al [2000]). 
Medicare compensates nursing home costs, if the insured has been treated in a 
hospital at least three days. Medicare only reimburses costs for doctors’ and nurses’ 
services. Home care is only provided if the client needs skilled nursing care and is 
homebound. However, for clients meeting the requirements, personal care services 
may be provided as well. Medicare home services are provided for free (HCFA 
[2000]) 
Medicare benefits have a time limit. Hospital stays are only covered the first 
60 days. Nursing home costs are only covered the first 20 days; after that, a certain 
fraction of the costs are covered for another 80 days. Thereafter, the insured cannot 
get any benefits from Medicare. Since 1983, Medicare offers hospice care. Hospices 
provide care for elderly with a terminal illness and a remaining life expectancy of less 
than 6 months (Amaradio [1998]). 
Benefits offered by private long-term insurances vary. Some only include 
nursing home care, whereas others only cover home care. Typically, only care given 
by nurses or doctors is covered. Normally, insurances offer a fixed per diem 
compensation if care is needed. Benefits are paid for a limited time; e g five years or 
remaining life years (Edebalk & Svensson [2000]). 
6.4 Coverage 
Since Medicaid is offered to all who lack sufficient financial resources, 
coverage is theoretically universal. Regarding Medicare, 33.9 million elderly were 
enrolled in 1999, out of a population of about 35 million (HCFA [2001]). The market 
for private long-term insurance has grown considerably the last fifteen years. In 1987, 
815,000 policies had been sold, and in 1998 that figure had increased to 5,842,000 – a 
growth rate of 21 per cent per year on average. Still, private policies only cover a 
small fraction of the population (Tilly et al [2001]). 
The total number of needy was in 1995 estimated to around 12 million, with 
6.6 million being 65 years of age or older (Feder et al [2000]). The majority of LTC is 
provided by family members, though. According to the 1994 National Long-Term 
Care Survey, though, 16.7 per cent of the elderly population was receiving long-term 
care, either community or institutional. Specific figures for different sub-groups are 
given in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Receipt of Community and Institutional Long-Term Care (LTC) 
among the Elderly, 1994 
Other 2,773 12.7 8.9 3.7 
Source: AHRQ (2000). 
 
It is clear that consumption of long-term care services is highly age-dependent 
also within the elderly population. The share of recipients increases from 6.5 per cent 
among those aged 65-69, to more than 80 per cent among those aged 95 or more. 
Apart from that marital status seems to be a very important predictor of long-term 
care need. 
In Table 12, some trends in long-term care can be observed. It shows that 
although the number of long-term care recipients among the elderly remained more or 
less constant between 1984 and 1994, their share of the elderly population declined. 
During the same time, the level of disability among recipients increased significantly, 
which is reflected in the fact that formal care and institutional care gained in 
importance compared to other forms of care. 
Per cent receiving Long-Term Care Elderly Population 
(thousands) 
 Total Community Institution 
  
Persons Aged 65+ 33,127 16.7 11.8 4.9 
Age 
65-69 9,815 6.5 5.7 0.8 
70-74 8,787 9.7 7.9 1.8 
75-79 6,553 15 11.5 3.5 
80-84 4,348 27.1 19.3 7.8 
85-90 2,450 43.2 26.1 17.1 
90-94 889 66.7 35.5 31.2 
95+ 285 80.5 37.4 43.1 
Gender 
Female 19,715 19.9 13.7 6.2 
Male 13,412 12.1 8.9 3.2 
Race.  
White 29,837 16.2 11.1 5.1 
Black 2,651 24.4 20.3 4.2 
Other 639 11.2 9.7 1.5 
Marital Status 
Married 17,662 10.7 9.3 1.5 
Widowed 11,338 26.2 16.5 9.7 
Never married 1,353 24.1 11.1 13 
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Table 12. Characteristics of Elderly Long-Term Care Users 1984 and 1994 
  1984 1994 
Persons Aged 65 and Older (thousands) 27,968 33,127 
Number of Users (thousands) 5,504 5,537 
Percent of All Elderly  19.7 16.7 
Mean Age (years)  79.2 80.5 
  Percent Distribution by Characteristic 
Gender 
Female 67.3 70.7 
Male 32.7 29.3 
Race 
White 87.1 87 
Black 11.4 11.7 
Other 1.4 1.3 
Marital Status 
Married 34.9 34.1 
Widowed 52.7 53.6 
Never married 7.8 5.9 
Separated/divorced 4.7 6.4 
Service Use 
Informal care only 51.2 40.1 
Both informal and formal care 19.3 25.7 
Formal care only 3.8 4.6 
Institutional care 25.6 29.6 
Source: AHRQ (2000). 
 
The use of home health care by persons 65 years of age and older changed 
dramatically in the 90’s. Between 1992 and 1996, the rate of home-based care usage 
among persons 65 years of age and older increased 78 per cent (from 295 patients per 
10,000 population to 526 per 10,000 population). Between 1996 and 1998, the rate of 
home-based care usage among elderly fell to 378 patients per 10,000 population due 
to funding changes that were part of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. In 1999, new 
funding legislation was passed, and use of home-based care is expected to rise again 
(Sahyoun et al [2001]). 
States have tried to keep spending on long-term care down through limiting 
the number of nursing home beds available. Furthermore, states decide on the 
reimbursement rates for Medicaid-financed nursing home beds. One possible 
consequence of this is that 20 per cent of elderly living in the community report being 
unable to get the amount of care they need. Among the elderly living in community, 
25 per cent are severely disabled with more than three ADLs hindered (Feder et al 
[2000]). 
It is hard to get a clear picture of aggregate costs for LTC in the United States, 
because different sources provide different estimates. One estimate for 1998 is that 
total spending amounted to $ 117 billion (1.3 per cent of GDP), with about 80 per cent 
going to the elderly. According to Feder et al [2000], some $ 100 billion were spent 
on institutional LTC last year, and another $ 50 billion on home services. Thus, 
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although home services have been expanded a great deal recently, nursing home care 
still is the dominant component of American LTC. 
Spending on long-term care for elderly has increased continuously the last 
decades. One estimate of the shares of the different sources of funding is given in 
Figure 2. Anyhow, even in this case, there is some uncertainty concerning the exact 
shares. However, these shares seem to have been quite stable over the last decade; the 
exception being private insurance, that has increased its share from one per cent in 
1993 (Feder et al [2000], Tilly et al [2001]). 
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Figure 2. Long-Term Financing, By Payer, 1998. 
Source: Feder et al (2000) 
6.5 The Supply Side 
In 1998, there were 17,458 nursing home facilities in the United States; an 
increase by 22 per cent since 1978. During the same time, the average size of nursing 
homes increased, so that the total number of beds increased by 38 per cent. These 
increases are offset by a marked increase in the number of elderly, though, so that the 
number of beds per 1,000 population aged 65 and over declined slightly, to 52.5 in 
1998 (and the corresponding figure for those aged 85 and over declined sharply). 
Among the nursing homes, about two thirds are owned by for-profit 
companies, whereas slightly less than 30 per cent are owned by non-profit 
organisations. The rest – 6.7 per cent – are government owned. These figures have 
been fairly stable in the 1990s. There are great differences between states, though; in 
Alaska, 57.1 per cent of nursing homes are owned by non-profit organisations, while 
merely 12.9 per cent are non-profit in South Carolina (Harrington et al [2000a]). 
Beside the nursing homes, there are community-based providers, whose 
residential services expanded during the 1990s. There were 51,227 licensed facilities 
of this kind in 1998 (a 45.7 per cent increase since 1990). The ratio of licensed 
residential care beds serving aged was 25.5 care beds per 1,000 population aged 65 
and over in 1998. These ratios varied widely across states (Harrington et al [2000]). 
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There were a total of 13,537 licensed home health care agencies in the U.S. in 
1998. The average ratio of licensed home health care agencies per 1,000 population 
aged 65 and over was 0.47 in 1998. This ratio varied considerably across states. For 
the first time, a decrease in the number of home health care agencies could be noted in 
1998. This drop was probably due to changing funding principles in the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997. Ten states did not use licenses, but certificates of agencies for 
participation in Medicare and Medicaid. The number of certified agencies in these 
states amounted to 9,726 in 1998. 
6.6 Discussion 
The financing of LTC is a very hot issue in the United States. The weaknesses 
of the existing system has gained increasing attention, and there is widespread 
concern that LTC may become problematic under the burden of ageing. 
The means-testing of most public LTC benefits in the United States means that 
a large fraction of the population has to find insurance against LTC costs in a market 
that seems to be deficient. The high costs involved in LTC make free-riding an 
attractive option for income-earners even in relatively high income strata. This thins 
out the market for private LTC, making policies more expensive. Furthermore, 
considering the high age at which private LTC insurance is purchased (69 on 
average), adverse selection might be a serious problem. Finally, the fact that LTC 
insurance is normally bought individually is another factor that tends to increase 
costs. Thus, it might be hard for many Americans to acquire appropriate coverage of 
LTC costs at a reasonable price. 
Two specific issues that are being discussed are how to promote private LTC 
insurance and how to deal with Medicaid spending down. It has been suggested that 
private-public partnerships – combining exemptions from Medicaid rules with tax 
subsidies – would encourage people to buy private LTC insurance. On the other hand, 
estimates show that as many as 20 per cent of the elderly population might be denied 
private insurance (Murtaugh et al [1995]), and furthermore there are worries that tax 
subsidies simply help those who would have purchased insurance anyway (Feder et al 
[2000]). 
One of the main problems in the American LTC system is the lack of co-
ordination between federal and state authorities. This split of responsibility creates 
incentive to shift costs, above all on the part of the states, that try to get as much LTC 
as possible covered by the Medicare program. Because of this problem, the expansion 
of LTC services looks very unsystematic when compared to other countries. The rapid 
increase of home care services paid by Medicare has not been planned but is rather 
the result of reduced policy guidance (Feder et al [2000]). 
Regarding cost containment, the American system is effective, since it restricts 
benefits to those that are financially needy. On the other hand, the divided 
responsibility between different programs makes it harder to achieve a rational 
allocation between different kinds of care. 
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7. Comparative Analysis 
In this section, findings from previous chapters are summed up, and the distributive 
aspects of various LTC systems are studied in more detail. 
7.1 General Characteristics 
In Table 13, a summary of characteristics of publicly regulated LTC systems is given. 
The table should be read as follows: ‘financing’: how public funds are raised, 
‘provision’: the normal kind of provider, ‘means-testing’: whether eligibility is 
dependent on the financial status of the client, ‘level of responsibility’: the most 
important government level responsible for LTC, ‘benefits’: whether in-kind, in-cash 
or both, ‘freedom of choice’: whether it is possible to choose between different 
providers within the public system. 
 
Table 13. Characteristics of LTC Systems 
Country Financing Predominant 
Provider Type 
Means-
Testing 
Level of 
Responsibility 
Benefits Free 
Choice of 
Provider 
Germany Social 
Insurance 
Private, non-
profit 
No National In-kind, 
Cash 
Yes 
Japan Social 
Insurance & 
Taxes 
Private, non-
profit 
No Local In-kind Yes 
Sweden Taxes Public No Local In-kind No 
United 
States 
Social 
Insurance & 
Taxes 
Private, for-
profit 
Yes Regional In-kind No 
 
The information in Table 13 is approximate, since there are often exceptions 
from the general picture (for instance, there is a small portion of Swedish LTC being 
provided by private companies). However, it is clear that even with these 
simplifications, the design of a national LTC system is not a one-dimensional issue. 
Among the countries studied here, one could argue that Sweden and Germany 
represent two different classic types for LTC financing: Sweden being an almost 
purely tax-based system, whereas German LTC reflects its tradition with a purely 
‘Bismarckian’ social insurance. Furthermore, the United States might be regarded as 
being close to another ideal type, since it relies as much as possible on private 
financing. Japan, on the other hand, mixes principles from different models. 
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7.2 Trends 
In the last ten years, the LTC systems in this paper have gone through 
important changes. But do the changes go in the same direction? A summary of trends 
in national LTC systems is given in Table 14.11 The first row shows the development 
of total LTC costs as a fraction of GDP. The process of aging has increased LTC costs 
in all countries. One exception is possibly the United States, where the extraordinary 
growth rate in the nineties might has compensated for the increase in LTC spending, 
so that its share of GDP remains more or less constant. The second row, showing 
public LTC expenditure as a share of GDP, draws basically the same picture. On the 
other hand, the share of public cost in total cost has been decreasing in Sweden, 
contrary to the three other countries. 
 
Table 14. Trends in National LTC Systems in the 90s 
  Germany Japan Sweden USA 
Cost/GDP + + + 0 
Public Cost/GDP + + + + 
Public Cost/Total Cost + + - n.a. 
Nursing Home Population Absolute + + 0 + 
 Relative  + 0 - 
Home Care Recipients Absolute + + - + 
 Relative  + - + 
 
Table 14 also gives an account of the coverage of LTC services. Even in this 
case, Swedish trends are different from those of the other countries. In Germany, 
Japan and the United States, the nursing home population has increased in absolute 
numbers, whereas it has been more or less constant in Sweden. If this population is 
compared to the total elderly population – labelled ‘relative’ in Table 14 – the picture 
is less clear. In the United States, the number of nursing home beds per capita has 
decreased, in Sweden it has remained more or less constant, and in Japan it has 
increased. Regarding home care, Sweden has contracted services at the same time as 
the other countries have expanded them. 
7.3 Distributional Impact 
One of the most important aspects of a LTC system is how it influences the 
distribution of resources between different groups in society. The financing and 
provision of LTC brings three important distributional conflicts to the fore: between 
high- and low-income earners, between men and women, and between different 
generations. Thus, we wish to analyse the distributional impact of various systems in 
all these three respects. 
                                                 
11
 Figures from the early nineties (OECD [1999]) have been compared with the most recent national 
statistics available. 
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7.3.1 Method 
There are important differences between countries that make a distributional 
analysis of LTC systems complicated. Different definitions of need are used in 
different countries, and the procedure to measure need varies. Furthermore, the 
systems vary in their generosity at a given level of need. There are also important 
differences in the degree of utilisation of services by the disabled; a fact that is 
especially relevant in the case of the new Japanese LTC insurance. Finally, within 
some countries there are important regional differences that makes a fair comparison 
even more problematical. 
In the following, these kinds of differences will be disregarded, and the 
analysis will instead be focused on how stylised versions of the systems work. A cost-
benefit analysis is undertaken for some hypothetical cases that are exposed to the 
various national systems (or rather approximations of them). These persons are 
assumed to have the same characteristics no matter what country they live in: they 
earn the same wage, face the same risks of being disabled or dying, and have the same 
family patterns. Some characteristics of the model cases are given in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. Model Assumptions 
 Male Female 
 
High 
Income 
Average 
Income 
Low 
Income 
High 
Income 
Average 
Income 
Low 
Income 
Starting income 41,000 25,000 20,000 38,000 23,000 16,000 
Annual Increase 1,400 800 370 460 300 60 
Work time (age) 24-64 30-60 
Prob. Intermediate disability EXP(-7.50+AGE*0.0585) EXP(-7.10+AGE*0.0550) 
Prob. Severe disability EXP(-6.05+AGE*0.0474) EXP(-5.83+AGE*0.0491) 
 
The first three rows in Table 15 describe the earnings trajectories for the six 
hypothetic persons. The ‘average income’ cases – for both sexes – are made as a 
linear fit to actual American earnings data (U. S. Census Bureau [2000]). The ‘high 
income’ and ‘low income’ cases correspond to a worker with a university degree and 
a worker without high school diploma, respectively. Assumptions regarding work 
time are chosen arbitrarily, but should reflect the fact that women normally have a 
shorter working life than men. Men are assumed to work between 24 and 64, women 
between 30 and 60. After retirement, all individuals receive a pension that is 75 per 
cent of the wage at 55 – a replacement ratio that is a good approximation for most 
developed countries (Feder et al [2000]).  
The disability data used are based on an in-depth survey carried out in the UK 
during the 1980’s (OPCS [1988]). In the same manner as in Mayhew [2000], an 
exponential curve is fitted to the age-specific disability data. This gives a reasonable 
approximation of the actual prevalence of disability in different age groups. The 
OPCS data divides people into ten categories, ranging from 1 (least disabled) to 10 
(most disabled). For simplicity, these categories are grouped as follows: ‘least severe’ 
(1 to 4), ‘intermediate severity’ (5 to 7), and ‘most severe’ (8 to 10). 
The OPCS survey also presents sex-specific data, but these are defined over 
three different age groups only and thus are not totally compatible with the 
comprehensive data. The differences between the sexes for two different severity 
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levels are presented in Figure 3. It is clear that the prevalence of disability among 
females is generally higher. Furthermore, the ratio between prevalence figures for 
men and women is relatively stable for intermediate disability, whereas it varies 
somewhat more for severe disability. To capture the differences between men and 
women, a ‘disability function’ was estimated for the sexes separately. The resulting 
probability estimates get very close to the comprehensive figures, despite the lesser 
precision in the data. The possibility of disability before the age of 24 is not taken into 
account, and it is assumed that nobody lives beyond the age of 100. 
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Figure 3. Male Prevalence of Disability Compared to Female. 
 
Finally, American life tables are used to calculate the mortality at different 
ages (Social Security Administration [2000]). It is assumed that probabilities of 
disability are independent, and also that they are not correlated with income. 
7.3.2 Calculation of Costs and Benefits 
It is assumed that the cost of care is the same in the four countries (which 
seems to be a reasonable approximation). Furthermore, it is assumed that there is no 
heterogeneity within the two disability groups: thus, ‘severe disability’ always 
corresponds to a need for full-time care in a nursing home, and ‘intermediate 
disability’ is assumed to correspond to a need for home care of 30 hours per month. 
The costs associated with these amounts of care are $ 40,000 and $ 6,000 per year, 
respectively, according to Feder et al [2000]. 
These figures, together with the disability data can be used to calculate the 
total costs that would be payable in the event of nursing care being required. The 
calculation of the present value of total nursing home costs is straightforward: 
∑
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where ia  represents the probability to be alive at age i, isp ,  is the age-specific risk of 
severe disability, NHC is the cost of nursing home care, and r is the discount rate. 
Regarding home need for home care, the issue is trickier, since informal care 
might be a close substitute. The number of potential informal carers could be 
calculated in accordance with Mayhew [2001]. However, data of age-specific 
consumption of home care services in Sweden and the USA indicate that the 
‘intermediate disability’ predict the consumption of home care services quite well 
(AHRQ [2000], National Board of Health and Welfare [2000b]). Consequently, we 
disregard the impact of informal care and calculate the present value of home care 
services according to the following formula: 
∑
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These two equations give the total present value of LTC costs over an 
individual’s lifetime that would need to be met from a person’s own pocket and from 
an insurance provider. However, there are different rules for how these costs are 
reimbursed in the different countries, and the principles of financing are different. The 
public benefit that the individual is entitled to is calculated in accordance with the 
system in each specific country – i.e. in the U.S. it is means-tested, in Sweden all 
costs are covered less an income-related fee etc. All details on how benefits are 
calculated are given in Appendix 1. 
The public benefits are financed by means of taxes, user charges, and social 
insurance premiums. To calculate the costs and benefits for the different cases used 
here, an approximation of the actual rules in each country was used. Details can be 
found in Appendix 1. 
7.3.3 Results 
To illustrate the workings of the different systems, some representative 
pictures of the stream of benefits and costs over a lifetime are given for a Swedish and 
an American man (Figure 4 and Figure 5). The X-axis covers the individual’s entire 
life span, and on the Y-axis are measured expected benefits, in the form of  help with 
LTC costs, and costs based on taxes or similar contributions in U.S. dollars. 
In Sweden, the public sector plays a much more important role, which is 
reflected by the high amount of payments (taxes) as well as benefits (total costs less 
out-of-pocket payments). In the United States, a man with an average income can 
only expect some Medicare benefits in home care, marginal Medicare benefits in 
nursing home, as well as Medicaid benefits after spending down personal income and 
assets. According to our assumptions, the risk of spend-down is comparatively low for 
this individual, and thus expected benefits are very small compared to the Swedish 
counterpart. The drop in costs at 65 is due to the fact that LTC is financed mainly out 
of taxes in both countries, and retired people pay less tax. Furthermore, retired 
Americans do not have to pay Medicare taxes. 
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Figure 4. Costs and Benefits, Male Swede. 
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Figure 5. Costs and Benefits, Male American. 
 
Results are presented in two different forms: firstly, a calculation of the net 
present value of the public LTC system, and secondly, the ratio between expected 
benefit and contributions. The net present values are given in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Expected Net Benefits from Public LTC Systems. Thousands of US 
Dollars. 
  Male Female 
 Discount RateHighIncomeAverageIncomeLowIncome HighIncomeAverageIncomeLowIncome 
Germany 0 -19.6 -17.4 -2.3 -16.1 15.9 39.5 
Japan 0 -39.7 -14.3 -0.8 4.5 20.5 29.9 
Sweden 0 -61.4 -19.6 1.0 3.6 28.2 48.1 
USA 0 -38.8 -17.6 2.8 -9.4 20.8 42.2 
 
       
Germany 5% -8,0 -10,2 -5,6 -5,8 -1,9 2,5 
Japan 5% -18,1 -10,1 -6,3 -7,8 -3,5 -1,0 
Sweden 5% -26,9 -13,3 -7,1 -8,0 -1,0 3,7 
USA 5% -14,8 -7,8 -3,3 -5,3 0,5 4,5 
 
Table 16 offers some valuable insights. Firstly, it is clear that all LTC systems 
are progressive in the sense that the expected net value always decreases with income. 
Secondly, all systems favour women – in every country and every ‘income class’, the 
expected outcome of women is better. This is partly due to the fact that women earn 
less, and partly due to the fact that they live longer. 
The level of progressivity varies among the countries studied. The most 
progressive country is Sweden, where expected return differs by as much as $ 
109,500 between the highest and the lowest group. Germany turns out to have the 
least progressive system, with a span of merely $ 59,000. 
According to the net return value, the Swedish system is the most favourable 
to women, with a net expected value of $ 26,600 on average. The German system is 
the most favourable to men, with an average of –13,000. Furthermore, the Swedish 
system is the most favourable to low-income earners ($ 24,500 on average) whereas 
the Japanese system is the best for high-income earners (-17,600). 
Another way of studying the distributive impact of LTC systems is to look at 
the ratio between expected benefits and costs. This is done in Table 17, with two 
different discount rates. 
 
Table 17. Cost-Benefit Ratios of LTC Systems 
  Male Female 
 Discount RateHighIncome AverageIncomeLowIncomeHighIncomeAverageIncome LowIncome
Germany 0 0.02 0.61 0.92 0.20 1.55 3.28 
Japan 0 0.41 0.66 0.97 1.10 1.70 2.50 
Sweden 0 0.40 0.68 1.02 1.06 1.72 3.05 
USA 0 0.18 0.38 1.15 0.67 2.20 5.03 
        
Germany 5 0.04 0.32 0.46 0.31 0.76 1.48 
Japan 5 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.51 0.79 
Sweden 5 0.21 0.35 0.49 0.56 0.91 1.53 
USA 5 0.10 0.21 0.52 0.39 1.10 2.35 
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The ratios in Table 17 draw a partly different picture than the net values in. 
Now, Germany turns out to have the most progressive system, whereas Japan and 
Sweden exhibit considerably lower degrees of progressivity. This is due to the fact 
that the systems in these countries are comprehensive, whereas in Germany and the 
USA, the family still carries the main responsibility. Furthermore, the most woman-
friendly system turns out to be the USA that offers a relative return between four and 
five times higher for women than for men. At the other extreme, the differences 
between the sexes are the smallest in Japan; a Japanese woman may on average only 
expect a relative return twice as high as a Japanese man. 
To see how the systems discriminate between young and old, two net present 
values are calculated: one at the age of 24 and one at the age of 60.  A graphical 
illustration of the average NPV:s with a 5 per cent discount rate is given in Figure 6. 
As indicated by the figure, Sweden burdens the young population the most with LTC 
costs, whereas the USA and Germany has a somewhat more equal distribution of 
costs and benefits over the life cycle. 
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Figure 6. Net Present Value of Long-Term Care at 24 and 60. 
7.4 Internal Rate of Return in LTC Systems 
Since a public LTC system of the PAYG type involves life cycle transfers, it is 
possible to calculate the internal rate of return offered by the system in different 
demographic settings. In this section, we follow Keyfitz’ [1985] approach for a 
national pension system. 
Hence, we assume the LTC system to be a PAYG system of the defined-
benefits type, i.e. people suffering from a certain degree of disability (in our case: 
‘severe disability’ according to the terminology above) are entitled to a certain 
amount of money (that could just as well be offered in kind). The transfers to the 
disabled are financed by lump-sum taxes from the working population (aged 20-64). 
  44 
There are some important differences to the case of pension systems: firstly, 
disability might appear before the age of retirement, which entitles the person in 
question to benefits. However, we assume that even disabled persons of working age 
make contributions to the LTC system (which is approximately correct if disability 
pensions are taxed). Secondly, not all retired are entitled to benefits, but only those 
that satisfy eligibility criteria. Thirdly, the prevalence of disability might change over 
time. We may formulate the necessary equations as follows. 
Firstly, we define the premium paid in each year by everyone of working age 
as 
( ) ( ) dxtxpdxxtxptem ∫∫ ⋅=
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where p(x,t)dx is the number of persons in the population between age x and x + dx at 
time t, ω is the highest age to which anyone lives and π(x) is the age-specific 
prevalence of severe disability. The equation to be solved for r, the rate of interest, 
involves the expected payment of Prem(t) and the expected benefits in case of 
disability: 
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where f is the calendar year where the cohort is 20 years old and l(x) is the probability 
of an individual to be alive at age x. 
Using Swedish population data, the IIASA population projection and the 
OPCS disability data presented above, the IRR from a public LTC system was 
calculated for the cohorts born between 1926-30 and 1986-90. Since the later cohorts 
are assumed to live beyond the end of the IIASA projection at 2050, age-specific 
mortality rates were assumed to be constant after this date. The resulting rates of 
return are presented in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Internal Rate of Return of Public LTC System 
Cohort IRR 
1926-30 1.65% 
1931-35 1.57% 
1936-40 1.46% 
1941-45 1.34% 
1946-50 1.34% 
1951-55 1.27% 
1956-60 1.16% 
1961-65 1.00% 
1966-70 0.82% 
1971-75 0.64% 
1976-80 0.45% 
1981-85 0.27% 
1986-90 0.10% 
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It is interesting to note that all covered cohorts enjoy a positive rate of return, 
albeit considerably lower than real interest rates. Furthermore, the rate of return is 
monotonically declining with each cohort. If this trend continues, which seems 
reasonable according to demographic trends, the internal rate of return would be 
negative for the cohorts born in the 90’s and onwards. 
This result might be surprising at first glance. Since the baby-boom generation 
was born in the 40’s in Sweden, one might expect that their children – people born in 
the 60’s and 70’s – would face a considerable burden financing LTC for their parents 
and that they would experience negative rates of return as a consequence. However, 
due to the age profile of LTC consumption, the baby boomers consume the bulk of 
their LTC when their children have already retired. Thus, the bill is passed on to 
subsequent cohorts. 
One issue that has gained a lot of attention lately is whether and to what extent 
improvements in the health status mitigate the effects on costs of population ageing. 
To see how this effect might alter our calculations, we checked what happens if the 
prevalence of disability at each specific age is decreasing over time. Rather arbitrarily, 
we assume that the improvement in health has the effect that each successive cohort is 
‘younger’ in terms of disability than the one before. This is the way disability rates 
would behave if they were more related to proximity to death than to age. Thus, we 
make the ad hoc assumption that each cohort over the complete time span studied is 
exactly one year younger (in terms of disability) than its closest predecessor and that 
the original disability data apply in the year 1985. The results are given in Table 19. 
 
Table 19. Internal Rate of Return with Improving Health 
Cohort IRR 
1926-30 0.57% 
1931-35 0.47% 
1936-40 0.36% 
1941-45 0.23% 
1946-50 0.23% 
1951-55 0.20% 
1956-60 0.09% 
1961-65 -0.07% 
1966-70 -0.25% 
1971-75 -0.43% 
1976-80 -0.61% 
1981-85 -0.79% 
1986-90 -0.96% 
 
There are two important differences between Table 19 and Table 18. Firstly, 
the rates of return are generally lower. This is due to the fact that the working 
population is financing LTC for older generations that are less healthy than they will 
be themselves at old age. Secondly, and due to the same phenomenon, the rate of 
return turns negative already with the cohort born between 1961 and 1965. 
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To sum up, we conclude that in the case of no changes in health status, a 
public PAYG system offers reasonable rates of return to most living cohorts in 
Sweden. However, as soon as the possibility of the of an improvement in health is 
taken into account, the picture changes, and the public PAYG system in fact turns out 
to redistribute from younger to older cohorts, and to offer negative rates of return to 
younger cohorts. The driving force behind this effect is the fact that – if disability is 
being continuously delayed – each cohort has to wait longer for the benefits to 
materialise, or, in other words, has to finance LTC services for a generation that is 
more unhealthy than the own one. One policy implication of this could be to switch to 
a system of partial or full funding of the LTC system. 
7.5 A Market for Private Insurance? 
Another use for the framework employed here could be to analyse the choice 
whether to buy private insurance or not from the point of view of the individual. This 
choice apparently would look different in the institutional settings presented here. 
However, it is quite clear that purchase of private insurance would be irrational under 
almost any circumstances in some countries. For instance, the limited importance of 
out-of pocket payments in Sweden probably makes a private insurance superfluous. 
The rapid disappearance of the private LTC insurance policies that were introduced in 
the nineties might be taken as an indication of this (Pacolet et al [2000]). 
Thus, we confine the following analysis to two different institutional settings: 
a) a completely private system, b) a means-tested system, resembling the American 
one. The question to be answered is whether it is rational to buy private LTC 
insurance and, if so, at what age. 
7.5.1 Method 
The model applied here is similar to the one used in the preceding section. We 
analyse the rationale for purchasing private LTC insurance by calculating net present 
values for different ages. Again, it is assumed that there are two disability states 
(intermediate, severe) corresponding to needing domiciliary or nursing home care, 
respectively. 
For premiums, we used the actual premiums charged by the American 
provider TIAA-CREF, a non-profit organisation. Since insurance is only offered 
between the ages 18 and 84, the premium rates have been extrapolated for older ages. 
The individual has the choice to buy an insurance policy with the following 
features: 
! a $ 100 maximum daily benefit in nursing home as well as domiciliary care 
! maximum 3 years benefit period 
! a 30 days waiting period 
Since we assume that the normal disability spell lasts for two years, the 
maximum benefit paid for nursing home will be $ 70,000. If only home care is needed 
– corresponding to the intermediate disability state – benefits will amount to $ 12,000. 
For the case where there are means-tested public benefits, we calculate a 
probability that the individual falls below twice the poverty threshold. This amount is 
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roughly $ 15,000, and the age-specific probabilities are calculated from American 
earnings data (U. S. Census Bureau [2000]), which gives us the following expression: 
{ }6405.106051.0000646.0,1min 2 +−= AGEAGEpAGE  
It is assumed that the state pays all LTC costs once the consumer falls below 
the threshold, thus making private insurance redundant. 
7.5.2 Results 
It turns out that the purchase of LTC insurance is very advantageous for most 
consumers. In a free market context, where the state is not involved in LTC financing 
at all, net present values of as much as $20,000 are noted for some ages. This figure is 
considerably less in settings where there is a positive probability that the individual 
will get his LTC need covered by the state; if benefits are paid to all who earn less 
than 15,000, the NPV is reduced to less than half. However, this is still a quite high 
number. 
The NPV at different ages is depicted in Figure 7. It increases monotonically 
up to the age of 68, where it peaks at a value of $ 18,800. This is remarkably close to 
the average age at which people buy LTC insurance. The break-even point, where 
expected future benefits equal future costs, is at the age of 93. 
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Figure 7. NPV of Private Insurance, No State Intervention. 
 
In Figure 8, the NPV of private insurance in a system with means-tested 
public benefits is depicted. Clearly, the existence of a public programme reduces 
expected benefits considerably; now the NPV peaks at $ 6,800. Furthermore, the 
existence of the public system reduces the optimal age for purchasing LTC insurance: 
now the peak is at the age of 52. The public system also moves the break-even point: 
now it occurs already at the age of 69. The reason is that the probability of income to 
fall below the limit for public intervention approaches one around the age of 80. 
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Figure 8. NPV of Private Insurance, Means-Tested Public Benefit. 
 
The results presented in this section are remarkable. In a free market setting, 
with actuarial premiums, one would expect the NPV to be close to zero at all ages. 
The marked deviation from this result that we have observed here requires an 
explanation. One possible reason could be that the disability data we use are more 
than ten years old and from a different country. This argument could have some 
relevance, but can probably not account for all of, or even most of, the fluctuations of 
the NPV. Another possible explanation is that the disability data used here covers the 
whole population, including those who are disabled already at a young age. Since 
these people would most certainly be rejected if applying for LTC insurance, it makes 
our calculation of expected benefits biased. 
Another possibility is that there is self-selection among the consumers. It 
might be the case that time preferences are correlated to risks. Hence, it is likely that 
people that have a low time discount factor, and thus demand LTC insurance at a 
quite early age, also care more about health and thus represent better risks. This is a 
hypothesis that has not yet been tested, but it certainly does deserve some further 
attention. 
The most important finding in this section is that introduction of a means-
tested public benefit reduces the optimal age for purchasing LTC insurance. Myopia 
on the part of the consumers is often mentioned as one rationale for public provision 
of pensions and LTC. Our findings suggest that, in this particular case, the state 
intervention would make things worse, since myopic consumers would be even less 
willing to purchase LTC insurance. 
7.6 Some Forecasts 
One reason for the steadily increasing interest in long-term care systems is of 
course the demographic changes that are expected to occur in most developed 
countries during the next couple of decades. Since need for long-term care is highly 
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age-related, the ageing of populations will certainly lead to increased demand. 
However, the relationship between demand for LTC services and ageing is not as 
clear-cut as it may seem. Demand for formal long-term care will, inter alia, also 
depend on the health status of elderly, family structures, and relative prices of input 
factors. One attempt to take such factors into consideration is provided by OECD 
[1998]. 
One rough estimate of the needs for LTC can be derived from mortality data. 
If, as recent research suggests, the bulk of LTC costs occur at the end of life, the 
number of deaths, multiplied by the share of deaths occurring in nursing homes, will 
produce a forecast of the needs for institutional LTC. The number of deaths for the 
four countries studied here are pictured in Figure 9. The figure implies that all the 
countries will experience a continuation of the trend of deaths to increase, but with 
different timing and steepness. 
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Figure 9. Number of Deaths in Studied Countries, 1950-2050. 
 
If the death rates in Figure 9 are multiplied with country-specific figures of 
the share of deaths occurring in nursing homes – ranging between 5 and 12 per cent – 
the data in Figure 10 are obtained. They imply that the USA will experience a much 
more rapid growth in nursing home places than the other countries. On the other hand, 
the American labour force is not projected to shrink as much as elsewhere. 
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Figure 10. Implied Nursing Home Places, 2000-2045. 
 
Relative changes to the year 2000 are given in Figure 11. It is clear that the 
timing of demographic changes is different in different countries. In Japan, the annual 
growth rate in deaths equals 1.7 per cent during the first two decades, whereas it is 
slightly negative between 2020 and 2025. The United States, on the other hand, will 
experience an increasing rate; it equals 1 per cent in the first 20 years and 1.3 per cent 
thereafter. Sweden and Germany are expected to experience a somewhat smoother 
increase in needs. 
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Figure 11. Implied Nursing Home Places. Index 2000=100. 
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8. Conclusions 
One common observation when national LTC systems are observed is that 
they evolve in accordance with social security traditions in each specific country (cf. 
Scheil-Adlung [1995]). The same goes for this study: we have found that Germany 
relies on a social insurance administered by semi-public care funds, whereas Sweden 
offers universal, tax-financed coverage to all irrespective of financial status, and the 
USA has a system where the individual has the primary responsibility for dealing with 
LTC risk. These findings fit quite well into the classical types of welfare states 
defined by Esping-Andersen [1990]: Germany being a ‘conservative’, Sweden a 
‘social democrat’ and the USA a ‘liberal’ welfare state. On the other hand, the 
Japanese system seems to be harder to define, since it combines elements of (at least) 
the ‘conservative’ and the ‘social democratic’ type. 
Despite these differences, there are some general trends that have been 
discernible in the four countries studied here over the nineties. Thus, total costs of 
LTC and total public expenditure on LTC have increased in all countries. On the other 
hand, the share of public spending in total LTC costs has decreased in Sweden, while 
it has increased in the three other countries. Another area where Sweden represents a 
special case is in coverage of services in general and home services in particular. 
While other countries have expanded services to more people, the Swedish strategy 
has been to concentrate on the most severe cases. However, given the high level of 
LTC coverage in Sweden already at the beginning of the last decade, these differences 
in trends simply imply that counties are converging toward a common degree of 
coverage. 
Regarding the distributional effects of the LTC systems, the simple model 
utilised here has generated some interesting findings. We have found that all systems 
are progressive in the sense that the balance between benefits and costs is better for 
low-income earners than for high-income earners. Furthermore, in all countries 
studied women are favoured by the system. This is due to the fact that women earn 
less money, have a longer life span and in general face higher risk of disability. 
Among the countries studied, the Swedish system is the most favourable to 
women and to low-income earners. At the other extreme, Japan has the least 
progressive system and Germany has the system that favours men the most. 
Furthermore, all countries have systems that are more favourable to the retired than to 
the working population. This is natural since the risk of being disabled increases 
exponentially with age. However, Sweden seems to be extreme even in this case, 
presenting a considerably worse balance to working age people than other countries 
do. 
One drawback with the model presented here is that it does not take people 
with no or very low income into consideration. However, since all countries offer 
LTC services under quite similar conditions to this group, this omission could not 
influence the observations too much. A more important objection from an economic 
point of view is that people’s behaviour is assumed to be insensitive to the 
institutional setting. This is most certainly not correct. On the other hand, since the 
purpose was to isolate the distributional effects of the LTC system itself, even this 
assumption might be justified. 
Another important observation is that the internal rate of return of the Swedish 
LTC system, which is financed on a PAYG basis, is positive for all cohorts born 
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before 1990. However, if the health status of the population is continuously 
improving, so that disability occurs at ever higher ages, the internal rate of return is 
considerably lower and negative for all cohorts born after 1960. The policy 
implication of this could be to introduce funding in the LTC system. 
Another finding of interest is that private LTC insurances in the USA do not 
work in accordance with what we would expect given the disability data used here. 
This finding reflects the fact that people purchasing private LTC insurance are not 
representative of the population in terms of health status. The fact that the net present 
value of purchasing private LTC insurance changes considerably over time indicates 
that there is some self-selection among customers taking place. Furthermore, we have 
found that the existence of a means-tested public benefit may shift the optimal age for 
purchasing private LTC insurance backwards. 
The issue of distributional effects of LTC systems in different countries 
certainly deserves to be studied more thoroughly. As soon as comparable data are 
available, it would be possible to relax some of the very simplifying assumptions used 
here, and to take differences regarding assessment procedures and availability of 
services into account. 
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Appendix 1 
9.1 Germany 
9.1.1 Contributions 
Income Below DEM 78,000 (USD 44,000): pays insurance premium equal to 1.7 per 
cent of income + general income tax 0.5 per cent (cover social assistance costs and 
investment costs of the Länder). 
Above 78,000: pays only 0.5 per cent income tax. 
9.1.2 Benefits 
Equal for all with incomes below 78,000: nursing home compensation would be DEM 
33,600 p. a. (US$ 19,000). We assume that the rule limiting benefits in nursing homes 
to 30,000 on average does not apply in this case. For home care, compensation is 9,000 
p.a. (US$ 5,000). 
People in nursing home below poverty threshold (2,120 DEM p.a.) get the difference 
covered by social assistance. This is in accordance with the average Taschengeld 
(personal needs allowance) granted to nursing home residents. 
9.2 Japan 
9.2.1 Contributions 
Insurance Premium: 0.6 per cent of income between age 40 and 64. For retired: 
depending on the income, the insured pays a premium amounting to between 0.5 and 
1.5 times the standard premium (US$ 280 per annum). 
General Taxes: Tax Rate 1.5 per cent (partly LTC insurance, partly financing 
hospitalised elderly). 
9.2.2 Benefits 
90 per cent of total cost. 
9.3 Sweden 
Figures and Exchange Rates for 1998 used. 
9.3.1 Contributions 
General income taxes: 3.0 per cent. 
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9.3.2 Out-of-pocket Payments 
Home Care: 635 SEK (US$ 80) per month, flat rate. This corresponds to the average 
charge (National Board of Health and Welfare [2000]). 
Nursing Home Care:  
If annual income less than SEK 144,000 (US$ 18,200): SEK 20,000 (US$ 2,500)  + 0.1 
* (Income – 48,000 (US$ 6,000)) 
If income more than SEK 144,000: 27,600 + 0.4 * (Income – 48,000) 
Maximum Charge: SEK 50,000 (US$ 6,328) 
9.4 United States 
9.4.1 Contributions: 
The Medicare tax is 2.9 per cent, divided between employer and employee. Out of the 
total Medicare budget of $ 200 bn., approximately 30 bn. Are LTC costs. Consequently, 
the ‘LTC part’ of the Medicare tax is 0.435 % (HCFA [2000]). Medicare taxes are paid 
while working. 
Furthermore, Medicaid LTC benefits are tax financed. The rate is assumed to be 1.0 per 
cent. 
9.4.2 Benefits: 
Home Care: Medicaid/Medicare pay 63 per cent of costs for all. 
Nursing Home Care: Medicare covers 20 first days, plus cost above a deductible of $ 
95.50 the next 80 days. 
Medicaid reimbursement: NHCost + PersonalNeedsAllowance – Income – 
MedicareBenefit 
Personal Needs Allowance is $ 1440. 
 
 
